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ABSTRACT
The purpose of this thesis is to analyze DoD's use of Low
Rate Initial Production (LRIP) on selected Army Aviation
programs within the acquisition life cycle of weapon systems
development. A comparative analysis is conducted on the
selected programs concentrating on significant issues which
affect the use of LRIP. The thesis focuses on the pre-
production phases of the acquisition process, the
organizations that influence LRIP policies and future trends
in procurement policy. The research includes an examination
of the AH- 64 Longbow Apache, the OH-58D Kiowa Warrior, the MH-
47 and the EH- 60 Special Operations Aircraft and the RAH- 66
Comanche. This thesis concludes that premature entry into
LRIP is a systemic deficiency in acquisition oversight which
leads to a proliferation in the required number of LRIP
systems. A recommendation to overcome this deficiency and
obtain a more accurate number is to identify the three LRIP
quantity determination elements separately. This would
provide the Milestone II Decision Authority more accurate data
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The purpose of this thesis is to analyze DoD's use of Low
Rate Initial Production (LRIP) on selected Army Aviation
systems as it applies to the present day acquisition life
cycle of weapon system development. Many program reviews have
indicated that LRIP is not being used effectively to manage
program risks inherent in the transition from development to
production. The focus of this thesis is to analyze and
compare selected programs and provide significant issues which
affect the use of LRIP. Additionally, it will recommend
appropriate actions that could reduce the risk of
transitioning from development to production.
B . BACKGROUND
The dissolution of the Soviet Union, together with the
current U.S. inventories of highly capable weapons, represent
opportunities for change in the acquisition process. One
change could entail reducing the need to utilize a high risk
acquisition strategy such as concurrency and fostering more
limited rate production. Concurrency is simply undertaking
production before development is complete. While this may
reduce the time span from concept to deployment, it involves
a commitment of substantial costs. These costs may be
wasteful in the event of program design modification,
cancellation, or redirection. The use of LRIP is one approach
to mitigate this risk. [Ref . 14]
LRIP is a term describing a low rate of output at the
beginning of the manufacturing program to reduce the
Government's exposure to large retrofit programs and resulting
costs, while still providing adequate numbers of hard tooled
production items for final development and operational test
prior to a full production release [Ref. 12] . The test and
evaluation conducted on these systems verify that the
production process provides material that meets the required
technical and operational performance requirements of the
system. When the decision authority believes that the system
would not perform to expectation, a decision to not proceed
beyond LRIP would be made and further testing would result.
The defense acquisition decisions made over the next few
years will be especially critical because they are intertwined
with the rewriting of national security policy and the
military strategy. Decisions on the next generation weapons
will define solutions to defense policy needs, dictate budgets
for the remainder of the decade, and either take advantage of
or miss the opportunity to improve the acquisition process.
[Ref. 1]
As we progress through a period of declining threat and
correspondingly fewer defense dollars, the number of programs
entering LRIP will probably increase. The primary reasons for
this increase include the perceived benefits of risk
reduction, the capability to "prove- out" emerging
technologies, and the ability to identify good candidates for
cost reducing manufacturing technologies.
To improve the acquisition process and take advantage of
the benefits resulting from the end of the Cold War,
acquisition managers should review acquisition policies and
guidance to ensure that they completely analyze the mission
needs, costs, and alternatives. This will ensure that cost-
effective solutions are matched to valid needs before
substantial resources are committed to their programs.
Increasing the utilization of LRIP to reduce risk in new
programs can be a vital part of this new approach.
C. THESIS OBJECTIVES
The primary objective of this thesis is to analyze how
LRIP has influenced procurement programs in terms of cost,
schedule and performance. Therefore, it will focus on
analyzing the pre-production phases of the acquisition
process, the organizations that influence LRIP policies, and
the future trends in procurement policy.
D. RESEARCH QUESTIONS
1. Primary Research Question
What impact does Low-Rate Initial Production have on
procurement programs?
2 . Subsidiary Questions
a. What is LRIP and how is it used in the acquisition
process?
b. What are the reasons a program enters LRIP?
c. What rationale is used to determine the proper
number of LRIP articles to meet operational test requirements?
d. Can prototype systems substitute for LRIP
aircraft?
E. SCOPE
The focus of this thesis is to examine the process that
Army Aviation System Program Managers go through to determine
how LRIP is used within the program. The research includes an
examination of the following Army Aviation Programs: The AH-
64 Longbow Apache, the OH-58D Kiowa Warrior, MH-47 & EH- 60
Special Operations Aircraft, and finally the RAH- 66 Comanche.
This study will be limited to the historical aspects of LRIP




Background and policy information, obtained by reviewing
applicable publications, included recent studies, periodicals,
and GAO reports. Additionally, Defense Logistics Studies
Information Exchange (DLSIE) conducted a search for related
information. Interviews with personnel internal and external
to the Aviation and Troop Command (ATCOM) were conducted.
These included current and former aviation program managers,
Defense Systems Management College (DSMC) subject matter
experts in testing and production, and':members of the Army's
Operational Test and Evaluation Command (OPTEC) . From this
investigation, a comparative analysis was conducted to derive
issues which may be of interest to future development systems.
G. ORGANIZATION
Chapter II is a historical perspective on past acquisition
reforms, the current regulatory guidance, standards, and
background literature. The milestones and phases of the
acquisition life cycle where LRIP is planned and executed
follows. Additionally, a discussion of some of the more
popular acquisition strategies is presented here.
Chapter III presents the requirements for proper planning
and preparation when incorporating LRIP in an acquisition
strategy. Additionally, the systems engineering principles
deemed necessary for proper transition from development to
production are identified.
Chapter IV is an assessment of the selected Army Aviation
programs
. The focus is narrowed to the planning and use of
LRIP as an acquisition strategy, the degree of development and
operational testing, and the outcomes resulting from these.
Chapter V presents an analysis of the data obtained from
the selected programs. This analysis will specifically
address the implications arising from the use and/or misuse of
LRIP.
Chapter VI states the conclusions, recommendations and
summarizes the answers to the research questions. It closes
with recommendations of areas for future research.
II. LRIP IN THE ACQUISITION LIFE CYCLE
A. INTRODUCTION
This chapter will discuss acquisition reforms and the
reasons that require them. Additionally, it will discuss LRIP
as it is currently used in the acquisition life-cycle. It
will highlight key aspects of the milestone decisions and
phases where accomplishment of LRIP planning takes place.
Following this, an identification and discussion of the
minimum regulations and guidance policies that program
managers should become familiar with are presented. Finally,
a discussion of two popular acquisition strategies, fly-
before-buy and concurrency, will be addressed.
B. ACQUISITION REFORM
Persistent management problems that have plagued our
acquisition programs, such as cost growth, schedule slippage,
and poor production, are nothing new. They may not be caused
solely by program management errors, lack of expertise, or
unforeseen events [Ref. 1]. Many problems arise because of
the acquisition process itself. As a weapon system progresses
from concept formulation to production and deployment, it is
constantly threatened, stretched, debated, delayed, and even
restructured by the many people who are part of the program
development process [Ref. 1]. These "key players" have their
own political agenda which might or might not be in the best
interest of the program. Political agenda or parochial
preferences range from members of Congress responding to
constituents, to Service executives whose tenures are often
short and consequently make short term decisions, to each
Service who wants to secure its reputation and obtain a share
of the diminishing defense budget. This is partly the reason
why problems with weapon system development persist despite
the numerous reforms of the past thirty years
.
The success of reforms as defined in the larger sense of
laws, DoD regulations, outside panels, and recommendations
from independent organizations, has been limited not because
these reforms embodied bad ideas or focused on the wrong
issues. [Ref. 1] In fact, reforms have been created to
correct a majority of the most well recognized acquisition
problems such as, developing more accurate cost estimates,
enhancing stability, improving the quality of the acquisition
workforce, etc. However, many acquisition reforms have not
been effective because the parochial preferences that motivate
the "key players" have not changed [Ref. 1]
.
Organizations responsible for developing requirements for
new weapons generally represent individual branches within the
Services that analyze their own mission area deficiencies and
recommend solutions. When the Army Aviation Center identifies
deficiencies based on its analysis of the threat, it tends to
propose solutions in terms of helicopters. When the Air Force
8
recommends solutions, it endorses fixed wing aircraft. Such
parochial reviews of missions and requirements, coupled with
each Service's unwillingness to compromise on design or
performance goals, contribute to the Service unique systems
proposed to achieve a common mission. Programs justified on
the basis of their unique characteristics make it difficult to
assess which alternative best serves DoD and can lead to
conflict between the optimism of the individual Service
programs and the skepticism that accompanies the organizations
charged with oversight of the programs. [Ref . 1]
New reforms were developed to reduce cost and schedule
overruns, to increase program stability, to emphasize
realistic testing, or simply to improve the efficiency of the
acquisition process to ensure a smooth transition into
production. Figure 1 identifies some of the major acquisition
reforms that date back to the McNamara initiatives of the
early 1960 's and continue up to the present time with the DoD
5000 series publications incorporating the milestone and phase
development process.
The Defense Acquisition Improvement Act, better known as
the Carlucci Initiatives, consisted of 32 initiatives designed
to address long-standing problems with major weapon systems
acquisition. Some of the problems were significant cost
overruns, schedule slippage, and performance shortfalls.
Conversely, the intent of the Packard Commission was to
provide a new acquisition culture so that decisions on
1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995
A McNamara Initiatives (1961)
A Fitzhugh Commission (1970)
A Commission on Government Procurement (1972)
A Office of Management and Budget Circular A-1 09 (1976)
A Defense Science Board Acquisition Cycle Study (1978)
A Defense Resource Management Study (1979)
A Defense Acquisition Improvement Program (1981)
A Grace Commission (1983)
A Packard Commission (1986)
A Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act (1986)
A Defense Management Review (1989)
Figure 1 Key Acquisition Studies and Reforms (Source: gao/nsiad-
93-15); WEAPONS ACQUISITION
producing a major weapon system would be based on realistic
program information and sound production practices. The
Commission proposed a streamlined organization for weapon
systems acquisition management and recommended a new Under
Secretary who would have full-time responsibility for managing
the defense acquisition system. The Commission also
recommended that each Service establish a comparable senior
position whose job would mirror that of the Defense
Acquisition Executive (DAE)
.
The Goldwater-Nichols DoD Reorganization Act complemented
the Packard Commission's recommendations and required the
Services to reorganize their headquarters acquisition
management structures. All these past reforms were met with
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initial enthusiasm, but, once the enthusiasm had dissipated,
the reforms' influence soon waned.
The Defense Management Review and the Section 800 panel
are the latest in the procession of reforms designed to
address and abate many of the acquisition problems. These
initiatives included increased acquisition training, more
independent cost analyses, and revisions to acquisition
regulations that emphasized a technical, event -based approach
to acquisition management . [Ref. 1] These approaches included
a major effort to ensure fulfillment of milestone exit
criteria before proceeding to the next phase and integrating
defense acquisition practices with the commercial workplace.
The concept of producing small amounts to verify
production readiness was considered in some of these reform
efforts. However, the concept of LRIP is relatively new.
Some of the reforms "packaged" the concept of LRIP as a
resource savings measure and provided guidance on reducing the
risks of transitioning from development to production. To
assist in implementing the LRIP concept and ensuring
compliance, the reforms also provided for some DoD oversight.
Although external oversight is a necessary step, internal
guidance designed to assist in the preparation for LRIP is
imperative.
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C. REGULATIONS AND GUIDANCE
With the vast literature on acquisition policy and
regulation, it is virtually impossible for program managers to
be acquainted with all of them. This section highlights the
acquisition references pertaining to the use and
implementation of LRIP.
Recently, the Air Force has developed the Air Force
Acquisition Model (AFAM) which provides an automated
encyclopedia of the entire acquisition process from concept
formulation to retirement. All required acquisition
regulations are now on-line for instant access.
1. DoD Directive 5000.1
Department of Defense Directive 5000.1, dated February
23, 1991 is the top level document that "establishes a
disciplined approach for acquiring systems and materiel that
satisfy the operational user's needs" [Ref. 2]. It
provides a one stop reference source that identifies all
applicable documents and regulations pertaining to weapon
systems development, and it defines the acquisition cycle in
terms of milestones and phases.
2. DoD Instruction 5000.2
Department of Defense Instruction 5000.2, dated
February 23, 1991 requires that program acquisition strategies
be event -driven, with entry into LRIP and full -rate production
based on accomplishing specific program results
12
[Ref. 3]. These program results are more commonly
referred to as exit criteria.
3. DoD 4245. 7 -M, "Transition from Development to
Production"
"Transition from Development to Production, " dated
September 1985, provides guidance on minimizing risks
associated with transitioning from EMD to production through
accomplishment of prerequisites in design, test, and
production readiness [Ref. 4] . The events are
transformed into templates that describe techniques for
improving the acquisition process.
4. DoN NAVSO P-6071, "Best Practices-How to Avoid
Surprises in the World's Most Complicated Technical
Process"
This is a follow on to the efforts of the Defense
Science Board Task Force on the DoD Manual 4245. 7-M
"Transition from Development to Production." It enhances both
Government and industry processes by identifying specific
practices and their potentially adverse consequences in terms
of cost, schedule, performance, and readiness.
[Ref. 5]
5. Military Standard 1521-B, "Technical Reviews and
Audits for Systems, Equipment and Computer Software"
Technical Reviews and Audits for Systems, Equipment,
and Computer Software identifies technical reviews and audits
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required of acquisition programs at various stags. As systems
proceed through development, the reviews provide feedback
concerning the suitability of system hardware and software
design and the risks associated with production decisions.
[Ref. 6]
6. United States Code (Title 10)
The following sections of Title 10 of the United
States Code are pertinent to the acquisition procurement
process. [Ref. 7]
Section 13 8 - Director of Operational Test and
Evaluation (DOT&E)
Section 13 8 authorizes the DOT&E as the SECDEF advisor
on OT&E. The term Operational Test is described as the field
test, under realistic combat conditions, for the purposes of
determining the effectiveness and suitability of the weapon
for use in combat by typical military users. Evaluation is
the appraisal of the results of the test. Section 138 also
states that Operational Testing of a major defense acquisition
program may not be conducted until the Director has approved
in writing the adequacy of the plans for OT&E. Additionally,
a final decision to proceed beyond low rate initial production
may not be made until the Director submits his recommendation
to the SECDEF.
14
Section 2430 - Definition of MDAP
The term "Major Defense Acquisition Program" means a
DoD acquisition program that is not a sensitive classified
program and that is designated by the Secretary of Defense as
a major defense acquisition program; or that is estimated by
the Secretary of Defense to require an eventual total
expenditure for research, development, test, and evaluation of
more than $300,000,000 (based on FY90 constant dollars) or an
eventual total expenditure for procurement of more than
$1,800,000,000 (based on FY90 constant dollars). The
Secretary of Defense may adjust the amounts (and the base FY)
based on DoD escalation rates.
Section 2399 - Beyond LRIP
This section addresses issues that must be considered
before approval to proceed beyond LRIP is granted and includes
the following guidelines.
a) Major Defense Acquisition Program (MDAP)
A major defense acquisition program may not proceed
beyond LRIP until Initial Operational Test and Evaluation is
completed.
b) Operational Test and Evaluation (OT&E)
OT&E of a MDAP may not be conducted until DOT&E
approves the adequacy of test plans. At the conclusion of
testing the Director prepares a report addressing:
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1) the adequacy of the Test & Evaluation, and
2) whether the OT&E results confirm or negate
system effectiveness and suitability.
c) Determination of the Quantity of Test Articles
The quantity of articles of a new system that is to
be procured for operational testing shall be determined by the
DOT&E for all MDAPs . The determination of articles for non-
MDAPs rests with the Operational Test and Evaluation agency
for the military department concerned.
d) .Impartiality of Contractor Testing Personnel
In the case of a MDAP, no person employed by the
contractor for the system being tested may be involved in the
conduct of the test. This limitation does not apply to the
extent the SECDEF plans for persons employed by that
contractor to be involved in the operation, maintenance and
support of the system being tested when the system is deployed
in combat
.
e) Impartial Contracted Advisory and Assistance
Servi ces
The Director may not contract for advisory and
assistance services with regard to T&E of that system if that
person participated in or is participating in the development,





Operational assessments may be used in conjunction
with OT&E. However, operational assessments based exclusively
on computer modeling, simulation, analysis of system
requirements, engineering proposals, design specif ications , or
any other information in program documents, may not be used
for the purposes of determining the effectiveness and
suitability of a weapon system.
Section 2400 - Low Rate Initial Production of New
Systems
This section addresses the decision process for
determining the quantity of LRIP articles and provides
guidelines for determining that quantity.
a) Determination of Quantities to be Procured for LRIP
The determination of the quantity of articles for
a system that should be procured for low- rate initial
production shall be established by the Milestone II decision
authority. The term "Milestone II decision authority" means
the decision to approve the Engineering and Manufacturing
Development phase of a major system by the official of the DoD
designated to have the authority to make that decision.
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b) Requirements for Low Rate Initial Production of New
Weapon Systems
The guidelines for establishing Low Rate initial
production with respect to a new system are:
• Production of the system in the minimum quantity necessary
to provide production- configured or representative
articles for test;
• To establish an initial production base for the system;
and,
• To permit an orderly increase in the production rate for
the system sufficient to lead to full -rate production upon
the successful completion of operation testing.
Section 2633 - Survivability Testing
This section requires that a MDAP system may not
proceed Beyond Low-Rate Initial Production (BLRIP) without
realistic survivability testing.
D. PHASES OF ACQUISITION DEVELOPMENT
The key features of the acquisition process are described
in DoD Instruction 5000.2. [Ref . 3] The phases, punctuated by
key milestone points are depicted in Figure 2. The following
discussion will highlight each milestone decision point and
acquisition phase where LRIP is pertinent.
1. Milestone f Concept Studies Approval
Milestone marks the initial formal interface between
requirements generation and the acquisition management system.
The decision to proceed from this point does not establish a
18
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supported: ovanapa Phase HI.
Figure 2 DoD's System Acquisition Process
15) ; WEAPONS ACQUISITION (Source: GAO/NSIAD-93
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new acquisition program. Instead, it reflects approval to
proceed with studies of alternative concepts that could
satisfy the identified mission need.
The Acquisition Decision Memorandum (ADM) is the tool
used by the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and
Technology which reflects the decisions made and the direction
provided by the Deputy Secretary and allows for program
continuation into the next development phase.
The Acquisition Decision Memorandum for this decision
point should:
Define the minimum set of alternative concepts to be
examined
,
Identify the lead organization or organizations for the
study effort,
Establish any exit criteria information or analyses that
must be presented at Milestone I, and
Identify the dollar amount and source of funding for the
study efforts to be conducted.
2. Phase 0, Concept Exploration and Definition
The focus during this phase is on defining and
evaluating the feasibility of alternative concepts and
providing the basis for assessing the relative merits of the
concepts at the Milestone I, Concept Demonstration Approval,
decision point. The acquisition strategy should provide for
the validation of the technologies and processes required to
achieve critical characteristics and meet operational
20
constraints. It takes the results of exploratory development,
non- Government applied research and development efforts, and
known or perceived Army needs, to identify and define new or
improved systems.
3. Milestone I f Concept Demonstration Approval
Milestone decision authorities, for the appropriate
ACAT levels, must assess the af fordability of a proposed new
acquisition program at Milestone I. Affordability of the
program can be determined utilizing affordability assessments.
These assessments are defined in terms of the life- cycle
resource requirements. They must compare program resource
requirements against affordability constraints and other
resource demands over the planned life- cycle. A favorable
decision at this milestone establishes a new acquisition
program, a Concept Baseline and authorizes entry into Phase I,
Demonstration and Validation. A program management office
should be established with the identification of a Program
Manager within 6 months. Additionally, acquisition strategies
must provide for the milestone decision authority to determine
the quantities to be procured for low- rate initial production
at the Milestone II decision point according to 10 U.S.C.
2400.
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The Acquisition Decision Memorandum for this decision
point should:
?
• Approve the initiation of a new program and entry into
Phase I, Demonstration and Validation,
• Approve the proposed or modified acquisition strategy and
concept baseline,
• Establish program specific exit criteria that must be
accomplished during Phase I, and
• Identify af fordability constraints derived from the
planning, programming, and budgeting system.
• Identify Low rate initial production quantities, if
appropriate
.
4. Phase I, Demonstration and Validation
The Demonstration and Validation phase is where the
principal program characteristics are validated. It relies on
hardware and software development and evaluation rather than
paper studies, since these provide a better definition of
program characteristics, higher confidence regarding risks,
and greater confidence in the ultimate outcome. Ideally, this
phase concludes with the construction and evaluation of an
Advanced Development Model. A refined acquisition strategy
should identify the minimum required accomplishments for this
phase to include identifying high risk areas, the risk
management approach for these areas and low- rate initial
production quantities. The quantity determination should be
a joint venture between the program manager, the prime
contractor and the DOT&E. They should consider the
22
fabrication complexity of the system, the length of the
production period, the availability of funds, and the testing
requirements
.
5. Milestone II # Development Approval
Milestone decision authorities must determine whether
continuation of development, testing, and preparation for
production are warranted. They must rigorously assess the
affordability of the program and establish a Development
Baseline at this decision milestone. If approval is obtained,
the program can proceed with completion of design and
preparation for production decision.
The Acquisition Decision Memorandum for this decision
point should:
• Approve entry into Phase II, Engineering and
Manufacturing Development,
• Approve the proposed or modified acquisition strategy
and Development Baseline,
• Establish program specific exit criteria that must be
accomplished during Phase II, and
• Confirm the low- rate initial production quantities.
6. Phase II, Engineering and Manufacturing Development
The EMD phase is where detailed design, fabrication,
and testing of the system is accomplished. This includes all
items necessary for the system's support. The intended output
is a hardware/software system whose performance and
reliability has been proven experimentally, along with the
23
documentation needed to support competitive production.
During this phase, one or more Engineering Development Models
may be produced and tested. As these models mature they may
be used as LRIP articles. The low rate initial production
experience should verify the adequacy of the manufacturing
process, confirm the stability and producibility of the
design, and provide a realistic estimate of production costs.
This phase concludes with a Technical and Operational
Evaluation.
7. Milestone III, Production Approval
A favorable decision at this point represents a
commitment to build, deploy, and support the system.
Milestone decision authorities must determine if the results
of Phase II, EMD, warrant continuation and an establishment of
a production baseline containing refined program cost,
schedule and performance objectives. It is important to note
that the decision authority shall not approve proceeding
beyond low- rate initial production until initial operational
test and evaluation of the program is complete.
The Acquisition Decision Memorandum for this decision
point should:
• Approve entry into Phase III, Production and Deployment,
• Approve the proposed or modified acquisition strategy
and Production Baseline, and
• Establish program specific exit criteria that must be
accomplished during Phase III.
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8. Phase III, Production and Deployment
The Production and Deployment phase is when the
system, including training equipment, spares, etc., is
produced in sufficient numbers to support its planned
deployment. System performance, quality, and operational
readiness rate will be monitored to assess the ability of the
system to perform as intended and to incorporate into its
production lots minor engineering change proposals to meet
required capabilities. Additionally, identification of the
need for major upgrades or modifications that require a




Fly-Before-Buy generally refers to building and
testing prototypes of a weapon system to ensure that the
weapon system is technically feasible before selection for
further developments are made. Fly-before-buy has been
supported by public law, DoD regulations, the Packard
Commission, and the Defense Management Review.
Confusion regarding the terms prototype and LRIP have
historically led to inconsistencies in acquisition policy and
strategies. Prototyping has been used in many different ways
including use as a low rate production article and
consequently, many different prototyping strategies have been
25
applied to weapon system development programs. With the
changing acquisition environment in terms of declining budgets
and fewer new program starts, it becomes even more imperative
to distinguish between the role of prototyping and the role of
LRIP.
In his study of the nature and role of prototyping,
Jeffrey Drezner identifies three key elements that are
required when defining a prototyping strategy. The three
elements are timing, level of system integration, and goals.
[Ref. 8] Timing relates to the technical maturity and
phase of the acquisition cycle in which prototyping occurs.
This includes the planning as well as the actual fabrication.
The level of system integration is described as identifying
the extent to which the prototype represents a production
representative system, which includes all necessary subsystems
for deployment. The third element, goals, addresses the
various types of risk and uncertainty managers may face. This
is accomplished by generating information that improves the
management of that risk or uncertainty.
The "goals" element is further divided into two levels
to identify the kinds of information a manager can expect to
receive by utilizing a prototype strategy. The first level
concerns the overall purpose of prototyping in the program;
the second, the specific objectives of particular prototypes.
The following are the overall purposes of the prototyping
phase and are considered the most aggregate of the two levels.
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Level One: Overall Purpose - Overall purposes are
closely related to the expected benefits of prototyping and
the decision stage of the program. Usually only one main
purpose is relevant to a single program but it is not uncommon
to have more. The overall purposes are Technology Viability,
Technology Demonstration, System Performance Validation, and
Marketing.
• Technology Viability: Generating basic technical
information to reduce technological risk in a general
sense. These are the 'building block' prototypes,
intended to add to the general knowledge base. They
generally occur very early in a program, often before
Dem/Val at Milestone I.
• Technology Demonstration: Exploring the possible
performance envelope of a system. Prototypes in this
category are often used to explore the usefulness of a new
design or concept in performing a specific mission, or to
demonstrate a particular application of technology. These
prototypes may occur early in the program in CE or Dem/Val
at a time when the design is not frozen. Production of an
operational system is often anticipated. This is in
contradiction to the current DoD policy on Advanced
Technology Demonstration which does not anticipate any
production.
• System Design/Performance Validation: This involves
design and performance specifications or requirements.
Also included here are demonstrations of the ability to
meet a specified threat, contract specifications, and
producibility concerns. Missions are specified, and there
is an expectation of production. This category might also
be called 'engineering,' since these prototypes are often
fabricated as part of EMD efforts.
• Marketing: This has to do directly with selling a product
or supporting a proposal. These prototypes are often
close to production configuration. These can be part of
any decision phase prior to production. Missions do not
need to be specified, though the prototypes are oriented
toward a specific functional requirement.
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Using the same set of categories as the main purposes,
the secondary purposes are intended to capture those aggregate
level goals that may be less important than the primary
purpose, but still represent an important focus of the
prototype program [Ref . 8] . Drezner identifies a second level
that he calls specific objectives that define the many
possible uses of prototypes and concedes that one prototype
may serve several objectives.
Level Two: Specific Objectives - Specific objectives
relate to the rationale underlying fabrication of the
prototype and to the specific information generated [Ref. 8]
.
The following 11 objectives, as defined by Drezner, differ
somewhat from those addressed by the 5000.1 acquisition
regulations.
• Experimental: This demonstrates a new idea, a new
technology, or an existing technology in a new
application. This usually occurs very early in the
program and may not have particular mission or production
expectations
.
• Exploratory: This evaluates the possible performance
envelope or tests the feasibility of a performance
requirement. It may not have a mission specified or
expectations of production, but does have explicit
performance goals. This usually occurs in the CE or
Dem/Val phases
.
• Feasibility: This demonstrates performance objectives
concerning a specific mission. This usually occurs in the
Dem/Val phase, though production may not be expected.
• Competitive; This is used to improve source selection
decisions in Dem/Val or EMD phases. Production is
anticipated when utilizing this objective.
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• Developmental: This determines operational suitability
and utility for military use. It may occur in the CE or
Dem/Val phases. This is the missionized version of an
experimental prototype. This is in .contradiction with DoD
policy which identifies an engineering development
prototype as one which is derived from Type *C (product)
specifications and is not intended to determine the
operational suitability of a system.
• Political : This achieves some political or corporate
strategy objective, demonstrates attainment of a political
objective, or responds to a politically established
requirement. This can occur throughout the decision
process, though it occurs most often in Dem/Val or EMD.
• Integration: This tests subsystem matching and full
system operation. It may be part of the CE, Dem/Val, or
EMD phases. Specific mission or functional requirements
exist
.
• Pre-production: This objective tests production
configuration after design freeze, usually during EMD.
Producibility concerns are relevant. Full rate production
is expected.
• Missionized: This evaluates performance with respect to
a specified threat using a fully integrated system. This
may occur in CE, Dem/Val, or EMD phases.
• Operational: This tests the operational suitability of
fully integrated systems, including reliability,
availability, and maintainability characteristics. It is
also used for doctrine development and integrated
logistics support planning.
• Upgrade: This objective tests or demonstrates subsystem
improvement to existing systems in operational use. It
occurs either during the production phase of existing
platforms or as a separate retrofit program.
Table 1 shows that certain objectives are intuitively
associated with particular main purposes. It becomes apparent
that as the objectives progress from experimental to upgrade,
the prototype increasingly resembles a final production
configuration. These relationships result from the kinds of
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(Source: Drezner; The Nature and Role of Prototyping, Rand, 1992)
risk and uncertainty addressed in each purpose and objective
category, as well as the level of system integration and phase
of the program.
2 . Concurrency
According to an April 1990 USD (A) report on guidelines
for determining the amount of risk appropriate for major
acquisition programs, concurrency is defined as the overlap in
time between the development of a weapon system and its
production [Ref. 17]. DoD's policy on major weapon system
acquisition stresses the importance of minimizing the time to
develop, produce, and deploy major systems for use by
operational forces. It also provides a framework for applying
concurrency and requires documentation that would substantiate
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the need for concurrency. [Ref . 2] Additionally, DoD's policy
permits the Services to build concurrency into their weapon
program structure.
In a nonconcurrent program, development is usually
completed before production begins. In a concurrent program,
production is started while development is still underway.
Figure 3 depicts an example of both concurrent and
nonconcurrent program structures.
The report specifies that the degree of concurrency
will be based on the savings in acquisition time balanced
against cost, risk, and urgency of the mission need in each
acquisition program. The report also responded to Section
801 of the National Defense Authorization Act for FY 90 & 91,
which required establishing guidelines for:
Determining the degree of concurrency that is appropriate
for the development of major Defense acquisition systems;
and
Assessing the degree of risk associated with degrees of
concurrency.
The concurrency guidelines specific to the LRIP
decision included:
• Ensuring that the acquisition strategy will provide
confidence that a stable design exists before the program
moves into LRIP (LRIP validates the production process and
the design must be stable at this point)
;
• Establishing clear exit criteria for initiation of long-
lead funding for LRIP and for entry into LRIP,
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• Ensuring that all development testing is properly time-
phased so technical problems are highlighted before they
become critical; and
• Ensuring that engineering development articles, which
usually will be used to perform the testing upon which
initial production decisions will be made, are
representative of the production configuration.
Concurrency can be an effective technique for
expediting acquisitions if it is well planned and controlled;
however, the practice increases the risk that systems will be
produced with major flaws. This requires that adequate
safeguards be built into any program to minimize the risks of
utilizing concurrency. At the very least, these safeguards
should provide for performance of at least one phase of OT&E
and the completion of planned OT&E before production.
[Ref. 9] Additionally, the degree of concurrency
should remain a planned part of the program and not dictated
by uncontrolled or unplanned events . So if delays in
scheduled tests arise, a corresponding delay in any production
decision should occur.
Risks associated with concurrency should be identified
and assessed throughout the program development to avoid
unplanned delays in scheduled OT&E before LRIP. [Ref. 9] OT&E
results are important because they provide early
identification of problems and can help prevent costly
retrofits and performance shortcomings. But if production
decisions are delayed until all deficiencies are corrected,
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budget cutters to converge on it [Ref . 1] . Thus, while
concurrency poses risks that run counter to sound management,
it appeals to the stronger motives of gaining commitment to a
program before negative information can become available. The
recurring theme is that completion of some OT&E prior to LRIP
is an especially important safeguard against the increased
risks of concurrent programs. [Ref. 10]
3 . LRIP
Low Rate Initial Production is the production of a
system in limited quantity to provide articles for operational
test and evaluation, to establish an initial production base,
and to permit an orderly increase in the production rate
sufficient to lead to full -rate production upon completion of
operational testing [Ref. 11]. It is also commonly
known as conservative concurrency. LRIP has two major
purposes. The first purpose is designed to demonstrate that
the production or manufacturing process is capable of
producing the required items in the required quantities at the
minimum cost. The second purpose is to produce "production
representative" items for the completion of Development
Testing (DT) and Operational Testing (OT) . The key here is
the term "production representative" which may or may not be
synonymous with the term prototype, depending on your position
and political point of view.
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In addressing the first purpose, it is critical to
address producibility in the initial planning and design
phase. The Department of the Navy stated in its Best
Practices manual:
Besides the more obvious performance and reliability
requirements, there is the additional demand of
producibility: it must be economically feasible to
manufacture a quality product at a specified rate and to
deliver end items capable of achieving the performance and
reliability inherent in the design. This design
requirement is not always well understood and historically
has taken a back seat to the more popular objective of
high performance. The results of this neglect have ranged
from factory rework rates in excess of 50 percent to
suspension of government acceptance of end items pending
major redesign for producibility. A strong producibility
emphasis early in design will minimize the time and cost
required for successful transition to production. [Ref . 5]
This type of planning is used to help minimize the
risk of committing the necessary resources for the production
phase by allowing for test and tryout of the manufacturing
equipment and process prior to full production release.
Of course there are problems associated with choosing
this or any other production approach. If the design
deficiencies cannot be worked out, no acquisition strategy or
production approach will suffice. The introduction of DoD
4245. 7M states:
Many programs simply cannot succeed in production, despite
the fact that they've passed the required milestone
reviews. These programs can't succeed for technical
reasons, notwithstanding what is perceived as prior
management success related to DoD acquisition policy. A
poorly designed product cannot be tested efficiently,
produced, or deployed. In the test program there will be
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far more failures than should be expected. Manufacturing
problems will overwhelm production schedules and costs.
The best evidence of this is the 'hidden factory syndrome'
with its needlessly high redesign and rework costs. [Ref
.
4]
The difficulty in implementing LRIP is the need to
invest in manufacturing tooling and test equipment earlier in
the acquisition cycle [Ref. 12] . This can prove to
be a very costly experience to both industry and Government
should a new flexible manufacturing strategy, such as Advanced
Technology Demonstration, be congressionally mandated for a
particular system [Ref. 13]
.
The second purpose, that of producing "production
representative" articles for Operational and Development
Testing, is quite different from the first purpose.
Production representative articles are more important for
Operational Testing than Development Testing but are preferred
for both. A 1990 GAO report on weapons testing identified
Development Testing as:
Development test and evaluation is done throughout the
acquisition process to ensure the attainment of technical
performance specifications, program objectives, and weapon
system supportability . Development testing is normally
done by the agency responsible for developing the system.
It uses such techniques as modeling, simulation,
prototypes or LRIP models to determine the extent that a
system meets technical specifications
.
[Ref . 14]
The GAO report went on to describe Operational Testing as
A field test, under realistic conditions, of major weapons
systems, for the purpose of determining operational
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effectiveness and suitability of the weapon system used in
combat by typical military users. Initial OT&E is that
portion of actual OT&E done throughout the acquisition
process before the decision to proceed to production. It
is accomplished using a prototype, pre-production article,
or a low- rate initial production article as the test item.
The 'final exam,' or the latter phase of initial OT&E
usually entails dedicated operational testing of
production representative test articles using typical
operational personnel in as realistic a combat environment
as possible. [Ref . 14]
The terms operational effectiveness and suitability
are two categories of operational testing. Operational
effectiveness is the ability of a system to accomplish its
mission when placed in use in the planned operational
environment. Operational suitability is the degree to which
a system can be placed satisfactorily in the field.
4. Summary
This chapter has provided the background for the
complex and challenging environment in which DoD systems are
procured. One finding of a recent IG report indicated that
premature entry into LRIP was caused by inadequacies in the
milestone review process, regulations, and policy guidance for
LRIP [Ref. 14]. In addition to the IG finding, research
indicates that program planning has historically been
accomplished when the urgency to meet the threat justified
highly concurrent development and production efforts. The
preceding discussion and review of the acquisition process was
necessary in order to gain an understanding of the
significance of the findings that impacted on LRIP.
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III. THE PLANNING PROCESS
A. INTRODUCTION
The DoD policy on Defense Acquisition Management, which
implements 10 USC 2400, is that Low Rate Initial Production
quantities are approved at Milestone II. [Ref. 16] This is
a change from the previous DoD 5000 series publications which
called for approval at Milestone IIIA. However, DoD
Instruction 5000.2 does not contain direction on determining
the LRIP quantities to be produced or the milestone exit
criteria required to be demonstrated before entry into LRIP.
This chapter will discuss the historical problems associated
with readiness for low- rate initial production followed by a
discussion addressing the prominent problems in determining
LRIP quantities and commitments.
B. READINESS FOR LOW-RATE INITIAL PRODUCTION
According to a recent Inspector General report, many
acquisition programs entered LRIP without completing
prerequisites in design maturity, development and operational
testing, and proper configuration management . Premature entry
into LRIP was caused by inadequacies in the milestone review
process, not following regulations, and lack of policy
guidance. Program planning was accomplished when the urgency
to meet threats justified highly concurrent development and
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production efforts. [Ref. 15] The report indicates
that there are three critical decision points that precede
entry into LRIP. The decision points are:
• The MS II, Development Approval, which approves the
program acquisition strategy of LRIP and LRIP quantities;
• LRIP long- lead funding approval; and
• LRIP approval
.
At the Milestone II decision point, DoD Instruction 5000.2
requires that the Director, Operational Test and Evaluation,
determine the quantities of LRIP articles required for
operational testing. [Ref. 3] Change 1, dated 2 6 February
1993, states that authority to proceed with LRIP may require
a separate program review and milestone decision authority
approval at a point specified in the Milestone II decision.
[Ref. 16] However, as mentioned before, DoD
Instruction 5000.2 does not contain directions on determining
the LRIP quantities to be produced or the exit criteria
required to be demonstrated prior to entry into LRIP.
Therefore, program managers are left to their own accord when
making these decisions.
The second decision point is the obligation of long- lead
funding to support entry into LRIP. The long -lead funding
decision point represents the commitment of funds to initiate
production- related activities. A 1990 USD (A) report to
Congress on concurrency guidelines proposed that clear exit
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criteria be established for initiation of long- lead funding
for LRIP and that the decision to commit funds be supported by
operational test assessments [Ref. 17]. As was the
case with the first decision point, DoD Instruction 5000.2
does not establish a policy for the commitment of long- lead
funding for LRIP. Therefore, wide variations of LRIP
strategies have evolved.
The third decision point associated with LRIP is the
approval of entry into LRIP. As stated, the 1993 change to
DoD Instruction 5000.2 suggests, but does not require, a
program review and milestone decision authority approval of
proceeding into LRIP. The new guidance also suggests that
exit criteria be established and, when successfully passed,
allow the program office to expand activities during an
acquisition phase.
Finally, the new guidance states that additional
activities or program reviews are triggered by failure to meet
exit criteria established for proceeding into LRIP [Ref. 16]
.
This causes development schedules to slip to the right and
jeopardizes the Initial Operational Capability (IOC) date.
C. PLANNING FOR LRIP
Present guidance provides some flexibility when planning
for LRIP. Although flexibility is required to meet the
specific requirements of many programs, the basic systems
engineering management concepts such as design maturity,
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producibility, testing, and production readiness are
applicable to virtually all programs [Ref. 14]. It is
therefore important to review each of the systems engineering
management concepts required prior to an LRIP decision.
1. Design Maturity
Design maturity is defined in DoD 4245. 7M. It states
In an operational environment, a mature design meets
operational requirements without Government or contractor
intervention- -no further field modifications or additional
equipment and spares are required to overcome design
shortfalls. In the factory, design maturity might be
indicated by the tapering off of engineering change
proposal traffic, once the test phase is underway. It can
assume that contract requirements are being met. [Ref. 5]
High risk of failure in material acquisition programs
occurs at the outset of the design process. While some level
of risk associated with a new technical concept may be
unavoidable, historically the risk has been magnified by the
misunderstanding of the industrial design disciplines
necessary to turn the concept into a mature product [Ref. 14] .
Detailed design planning can help reduce the risks of
proceeding into production with an immature design. In his
book, Systems Engineering and Analysis, Blanchard addresses
the requirements of detailed design. The basic design
objectives for the system and its elements must be compatible




The goal is to incorporate only the necessary
characteristics to meet the requirement, not too many as to
over- design and not too few as to under- design. It is
important that programs not enter LRIP with many, if any,
unresolved design problems. Programs entering LRIP without a
mature, stable design, frequently experience production
related problems and delays that introduce the need to make
additional LRIP awards to preclude the costs associated with
a break in production [Ref . 14] .
2. Producibility
Blanchard defines producibility as "the characteristic
of system design that allows for the effective and efficient
production of one or a multiple quantity of items of a given
configuration" [Ref. 17]. The manufacturing plan is the
vehicle in which the contractor achieves his producibility
goals. The manufacturing plan identifies the approach for
duplicating a product configuration in a cost-effective
manner. It is usually based on the results of detailed
planning and analysis activities that have been conducted to
define the optimum approach for product manufacture.
According to the Department of the Navy's Best
Practices manual on "How to Avoid Surprises in the World's
Most Complicated Technical Process," a manufacturing plan is
normally submitted as a contract data requirement at the end
of EMD, or early in LRIP [Ref. 5] . This type of approach
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encourages late planning for product manufacture and precludes
tradeoffs between manufacturing process alternatives and
product design configurations. Additionally, the late
planning causes many "surprise" product redesigns for
producibility. Conducting manufacturing planning concurrently
with the product design process will preclude most product
redesign efforts for producibility considerations that would
otherwise be revealed after LRIP. The Best Practices manual
goes on to say that the manufacturing planning activities that
should be accomplished before LRIP and addressed in the
manufacturing plan include:
• Estimating manufacturing resource requirements
• Schedule definition
• Personnel requirements
• Make or buy decisions
• Facilities
Resource Requirements
The manufacturing process and procedures identify all
requirements for tooling, capital equipment, and plant
facilities. Therefore, an accurate definition of system
requirements is necessary. Since the product design
configuration has a direct influence on the manufacturing
processes and procedures, determination of manufacturing
resource requirements should be accomplished early in EMD.
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Schedule Definition
The schedule presented in the manufacturing plan
should provide assurance that the necessary resources will be
available when needed. The details of the entire project
schedule should be the top level planning baseline.
Personnel Requirements
The number of contractor personnel necessary to
manufacture the product, the specific skill types, and the
ability of the contractor to meet these requirements should be
defined. Personnel plans should be consistent with the
planned personnel requirements to ensure that adequate skill
types and quantities are available and maintained.
Make or Buy
A make or buy plan establishes the distribution of
effort between the prime contractor and the subcontractors.
The percentage of weapon system components that are
subcontracted can be as high as 80 percent. The make or buy
approach can have tremendous impact in cost and schedule risk
and must therefore be addressed in sufficient detail.
Specific attention should be given to the make or buy
decisions since there may be differences between overall
contractor goals in structuring these decisions and the goal





The facilities include all plant and capital equipment
necessary to accomplish product manufacture. Because this
translates into large dollar amounts, a facilities plan should
be addressed as part of the manufacturing plan.
3. Testing
An April 1990 USD (A) report to Congress concluded that
the determination of whether a program is ready to enter LRIP
must be based upon the totality of component, subsystem, and
system testing that is done, and the results of this testing
[Ref . 17] . Development testing, as mentioned earlier,
requires that both the contractor and the Government conduct
DT&E. To increase the efficiency of DT&E, the Government
should participate in some of the contractor's testing. This
will help eliminate redundant testing and provide more user
oriented test results which should result in a more mature
system for OT&E. Development testing is designed to insure
that the design meets the technical specifications required
for the system.
Operational Assessments are a quasi form of testing
that should be considered in planning for use of LRIP.
Operational Assessments are evaluations of operational
effectiveness and suitability made by an independent
operational test activity, with user support as required, on
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other than production systems [Ref. 14]. Operational
Assessments differ from operational test and evaluation
because production systems are not required. The key
differences with assessments are that they use technology
demonstrators, prototypes, or engineering development models
that should be, but are not required to be, "production
representative" [Ref. 14]
.
Current DoD policy requires early and progressive
assessments of operational capability, including realistic
operational testing before full-scale production starts
[Ref. 14]. The April 1990 USD (A) report to Congress stated
that decisions to commit funds for LRIP can be supported by
operational assessments [Ref. 17] . Performing early
operational assessments when production representative test
articles are not available is a step forward in filling a void
in the availability of actual OT&E results.
LRIP is traditionally considered as a means by which
test articles are acquired for OT&E. However, the Congress
and DoD's Inspector General have expressed concern that the
Services' use of LRIP has sometimes resulted in de facto full-
rate production before any OT&E is conducted [Ref. 10]. In
their view, program managers, fearing a threat of program
disruption, have a strong incentive to get the production line
started before data from the final phases of testing are
available.
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Operational assessments can be used here to identify
significant trends noted in development efforts, programmatic
voids, areas of risk, and the ability of the program to
support adequate operational testing. This should help
mitigate the Congress and IG's fears.
The Best Practices manual summarizes how testing and
testing schedules should be planned. Most test schedules are
planned to support the major milestone reviews that occur
during the development of a weapon system. The tests are
planned to provide positive test results for presentation at
the milestone reviews, in order to obtain approval for the
project to proceed to the next milestone [Ref . 5] . This leads
to a test philosophy in which passing tests is the main
objective of the test program, rather than considering the
engineering need for the test or the technical information
provided by the test results. If test schedules are not
allowed sufficient time for redesign and retest, changes and
retesting may be delayed until production equipment is
available. If the changes prove incorrect and additional
redesign is required, production units may have to be
retrofitted and many ECPs may be required during the early
phases of production. This will then limit the effectiveness
and rationale behind using LRIP as part of the acquisition
strategy. The overall success of a carefully integrated test
program will result in a minimum of resources applied to
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testing, a viable LRIP program, and the elimination of a
costly ECP or retrofit program during production. [Ref. 5]
4 . Production Readiness
DoD's policy is to begin planning for production early
in the acquisition process to ensure that the weapon system
design not only meets performance objectives but also can be
produced in an economical and timely manner.
The Production Readiness Review (PRR) is the process
used for ensuring the manufacturing operation and product
documentation is ready for production. DoD Instruction 5000.2
defines a system as ready for production when the
producibility of the production design and the managerial and
physical preparations necessary for initiating and sustaining
a viable production effort have progressed so that a
production commitment can be made without incurring
unacceptable risk [Ref. 3].
The PRR is a technical review of the completeness and
producibility of the product design and the planning and
preparation for production. Additionally, it typically
addresses product design, industrial resources, production
engineering and planning, materials and purchased parts, and
quality assurance [Ref. 14]
.
The production readiness review must be satisfactorily
accomplished before favorable LRIP or full production
decisions are made. Properly planned, staffed, and executed,
48
PRRs are valid tools for assessing the depth of production
engineering. The Best Practices manual identifies some key-
indicators at the reviews that will ensure that the
manufacturing process is qualified, or at least on track.
These include:
a. A low number of waivers and deviations on the parts and
materials that are built per process specifications. The
low number of ECPs ensures a mature design and mature
manufacturing process, such that product integrity is
measurable
.
b. The existence of a 'hands on' personnel training
program with a mechanism in place for personnel
recertif i cat ion.
c. Successful functional, physical, and configuration
audits. Such audits add confidence and credibility to the
maturity of both the design and the manufacturing process.
d. Adequate time and dollars to perform production trial
runs to verify that skills have been acquired through
training, that process instructions are usable and
accurate, that capacity predictions are validated, and most
important, that the process is in "statistical control" and
is stable.
e. The existence of a periodic production test program.
This test program will ensure that the production units are
being built to the product baseline and inherent
performance and quality is being maintained.
f. A single shift, eight -hour day, five day work week
operation is planned for all production schedules,
particularly during LRIP. [Ref. 5]
5. Summary
The Government can and frequently does, incur
significant program risk from systems entering LRIP when their
designs are not stable and readiness to enter the production
process has not been verified. The significance of this
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chapter was to emphasize that there is no substitute for
proper production planning. Additionally, it provided
specific actions intended to mitigate the risks of
transitioning from development to production.
DoD regulations allow for some flexibility when
developing an acquisition strategy. However, flexibility is
less appropriate in ensuring that systems have a stable
design, be producible, and be able to demonstrate the
capability to pass realistic operational testing before a full
rate production decision is made. There are many publications
to assist program management organizations in the proper
planning for production readiness . The LRIP planning process
is just the first step to ensuring that the program management
office's considerations for production include the complexity
of the system, the total number to be procured, industrial





This chapter will analyze four Army Aviation programs.
These programs include the AH- 64 Longbow Apache, the OH-58D
Kiowa Warrior, the MH-47 and EH- 60 Special Operations Aircraft
and the RAH- 66 Comanche. The focus of the analysis is
narrowed to the current program status, the planning and use
of LRIP as an acquisition strategy and the degree of
development and operational testing supporting LRIP. Much of
the data came directly from the individual program management
staff members. Additional data were obtained from GAO reports
and subject matter experts within the acquisition community.
Particular attention was devoted to the determination of
individuals involved in the LRIP decision process and the
quantities of LRIP articles obtained by each program. The
results from the analysis of these cases will provide lessons
learned for future program development efforts.
B. AH- 64 LONGBOW APACHE
1. Program Status
The Longbow Apache is a modification of the AH- 64
Apache helicopter. The modification program calls for adding
a mast-mounted, millimeter wave fire control radar, with a
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passive radiQ-f requency ^^^^™1^™
interferometer, and a Hellfire ^^ffiS©°
missile. The millimeter- wave Amy Wmil&mifr
radar detects, classifies, and
prioritizes both stationary and
moving targets. The
interferometer detects hostile
radar emissions and provides the
Longbow Apache information on the Figure 4 Longbow Apache
direction and identity of the opposing air defense weapon.
The RF Hellfire missiles are known as the "Longbow" system.
This "Longbow" system could be adapted to other types of
helicopters in the future. [Ref. 19] In addition to
the fire control radar and missile enhancements, the airframe
will also be modified to include a fully integrated cockpit
designed to reduce the pilot workload, expanded forward
avionics bays to accommodate Longbow equipment and upgraded
generators, and new wiring for the fire control radar.
An EMD contract for the Longbow Apache was awarded to
McDonnell Douglas Helicopter Company in August 1989. As the
prime contractor for the AH- 64 Apache, McDonnell Douglas
Helicopter Company is developing the airframe modifications to
accommodate the Longbow enhancements and is responsible for
the total integration of the airframe, fire control radar and
the missile system. [Ref. 19] The Army plans to begin low
rate production in April 1995, with deliveries scheduled
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through the year 2000. Figure 5 depicts the acquisition
schedule for the Longbow Apache.
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Figure 5 Longbow Apache Program Schedule (Source: Longbow Apache
Program Office)
2 . LRIP Planning
Since the Longbow Apache is a modification of the AH-
64 Apache it is necessary to discuss the acquisition of the
AH- 64. According to a 1990 GAO report, the Apache entered
production with an immature design and undemonstrated
logistical supportability . [Ref. 20] Furthermore,
there was no low rate initial production phase and no follow-
on testing performed. This was in spite of the Army Materiel
Systems Analysis Activity's (AMSAA) recommendation to enter
limited production followed by another decision point to
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reassess the supportability shortfalls and the impending
design changes. In today's political and military climate in
terms of acquisition oversight and budget constraints, it
would be difficult for program managers to make similar
decisions.
In discussing this issue with the program management
staff, they consider the GAO report as an inaccurate
representation of the facts. The program management office
reported that the Apache did indeed proceed through an LRIP
phase although they acknowledged that the term "LRIP" was not
in vogue at the time [Ref. 21]. They admit that LRIP
was not planned from the outset as an acquisition strategy in
FY 82 primarily because it was not required. However, the
program office did recognize from the outset that the initial
production quantity would be small and that af fordability,
operational tests and initial production rates for smooth
transition into full rate production were both logical and
necessary.
According to the Apache Program office, the initial
production quantity was based solely on affordability.
Affordability by itself is not one of the three considerations
mentioned in DoD 5000.1 when deciding on initial production
quantities, but this seems to be the primary determinate in
most cases. There were 15 aircraft planned as the initial
production quantity but the number was reduced to 11 based
upon a "Should Cost" determination of available funds and
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subsequent negotiations with the prime contractor. In the
case of the Apache, these first 11 aircraft were considered by
the program office to be sufficient for completion of
operational testing and for the establishment of an initial
production base.
The contractor's role in determining LRIP quantities
for the Apache was limited to responding to the Army's mission
requirements and to propose the cost of satisfying those
requirements. Af fordability considerations forced compromises
between the initial requirement of 15 and the resultant number
of 11. Since the contractor is primarily responsible for two
of the three LRIP quantity determination factors, it would
seem astute to allow them more involvement in the decision
process
.
In contrast to the AH- 64 Apache, the Longbow Apache
modification program offers the opportunity to avoid many of
the problems that occurred in the fielding of the Apache.
[Ref. 22] Chief among the acquisition strategy features is
its lack of concurrency. The production of the Longbow Apache
is not planned to begin until the new millimeter-wave radar
technology has been demonstrated to work.
The Longbow Apache acquisition strategy identifies the
incorporation of an LRIP phase. According to information
obtained from the program office, 24 aircraft are planned for
LRIP with a contract award scheduled for November 1995
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[Ref. 23]. The number was established in June 1992
and derived from budget/POM drills and the reductions in the
Army's Total Obligation Authority (TOA) . The PM and
contractor would prefer a number ranging between 3 6 and 48 in
order to meet the contractor's established minimum sustaining
rate. Even though the contractor had established a minimum
sustaining rate, they were not involved in the final LRIP
quantity decision. It was based strictly on budget
constraints. Table 2 indicates the initial and most current
program milestone dates for the Longbow Apache.
TABLE 2 LONGBOW APACHE MILESTONE DATES
Longbow Apache Initial Current
Program Initiation March 19 83 Black Program
Dem/Val
Milestone I
August 1985 August 19 85
EMD
Milestone II
December 1990 December 1990
LRIP
Milestone Ilia




November 1995 November 199 7
(Source: Longbow Apache Program Office!
The Defense Acquisition Board (DAB)
,
with its issuance
of the Acquisition Decision Memorandum, has directed the PM to
ensure that required system performance and reliability are
demonstrated before moving into production. The Longbow
program is currently scheduled to hold a long lead initial
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program review in November 1994 with a DAB review in October
1995 to proceed into LRIP. Additionally, there is a second
LRIP contract award for 46 aircraft scheduled for November
1996. Following the second LRIP decision there is a full
production milestone scheduled for November 1997.
The key to this acquisition strategy is that the Army
will delay making an LRIP decision until initial operational
testing and evaluation has been completed. This will allow
the Longbow Apache program to proceed only as fast as
technology will permit.
3. Testing
The Longbow Apache test program is designed to provide
the data necessary for proper decision making. [Ref . 22] The
schedule indicates that the program plans to complete 900
hours of operational test and evaluation (OT&E) prior to the
LRIP decision. The tests include: Early User Test and
Experimentation (EUT&E) , Force Development Test and
Experimentation (FDT&E) , and an IOT&E. These tests are
planned to be conducted using production- representative
aircraft, with limited contractor involvement, and will
simulate realistic combat situations in day, night and adverse
weather conditions. [Ref. 22] They encompass the evaluation
of operational effectiveness as well as operational
suitability for operator, maintainer and support personnel.
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In contrast to the Longbow Apache testing, the AH- 64
Apache operational testing was not as comprehensive. The
Apache operational testing consisted of' 400 hours and was not
conducted under realistic combat conditions. Additionally,
production representative aircraft were not used. Instead,
the operational test was performed on aircraft that included
key subsystems that were planned to be redesigned after
completion of the tests. The logistical support system was
not tested because almost half of all Apache maintenance
actions during operational testing were accomplished by the
contractor or with contractor assistance. [Ref. 20] The
intent of operational testing is to obtain results from a
production representative article using typical operational
personnel in a realistic combat environment. What the program
called operational tests is by definition a developmental
test.
4. Summary
Unlike the AH- 64 which omitted an LRIP phase and
follow- on operational testing, the Longbow Apache has
incorporated an LRIP phase into the acquisition plan. The
program office, which has planned to acquire 70 aircraft
during this phase, expects to award one LRIP contract in
November 1995 and a second in November 1996. During this
time, the LRIP aircraft will undergo Early User Test and
Experimentation, Force Development Test and Experimentation,
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and an IOT&E. These test results should be ready prior to the
full -rate production decision. This should provide an
opportunity to carefully consider the 'status of the program
and address any problems before proceeding with production.
The determination of the LRIP quantities was based
almost entirely on the constraints of the 1994 POM build and
the reductions in the TOA and RDTE accounts. Input from the
contractor as to the desired quantities was, at best,
minimally considered. The contractor should provide input
into the quantity decisions primarily because he is
responsible for establishing a production base and
transitioning the aircraft from a development configuration
into a production configuration. In the case of the Longbow
Apache, McDonnell Douglas identified their minimum sustaining
rate to be between 36 and 48. The final LRIP decision was
between 12 and 24 aircraft less than the contractor's minimum
requirements for the first lot. The second LRIP lot is more
in line with the contractor's needs and may have been made
just for that reason.
Given current world conditions, there seems to be less
of a reason for the Apache Longbow to attempt any concurrent
development. The existing threat poses no significant
challenges and therefore the Longbow Apache program should
progress as fast as technology allows. This is not to say
that the program is immune from other challenges. With
reduced procurement budgets, the Comanche helicopter poses a
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significant threat to the Longbow Apache with respect to their
similar missions and armament configurations. The second LRIP
contract might be one tactic used by the program to reduce the
chance of program termination.
C. OH-58D KIOWA WARRIOR
1. Program Status
The Kiowa Warrior is a
modification of the OH-5 8D Army
Helicopter Improvement Program
(AHIP) helicopter. The
modification of the OH-58A Kiowa
to the OH-58D Kiowa Warrior has
proceeded through four distinct
KIOWA WARRIOR
Kiowaphases: 1) basic OH-58D AHIP Figure 6 OH-58D
Warrior
procurement from FY84-FY89,
2) congressionally directed provisioning for armed OH-58D
procurements from FY89-FY91, 3) fully armed aircraft
procurements (Kiowa Warrior) from FY92-FY93, and 4) the
retrofit in FY92-FY95 of previously produced basic OH-58D
AHIPs to OH-58D Kiowa Warrior aircraft.
The AHIP was an enhanced, upgraded version of the
OH-58C observation helicopter. Its most prominent feature was
the mast -mounted site system which protruded above the rotor
hub. This mast -mounted site, which the Kiowa Warrior
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retained, was designed to acquire, locate, and laser-designate
targets day or night. It was able to obtain these features in
obscured atmospheric conditions while remaining below the
terrain mask. The mast mounted site was intended to minimize
the exposure of the helicopter to enemy radar and electro-
optical detection devices, and therefore was expected to
enhance survivability.
The AHIP was designed to fulfill three battlefield
roles. The roles were attack, air cavalry and field artillery
aerial observer (FAAO) . In the attack role, the AHIP would
accompany the attack helicopters in a "hunter-killer"
arrangement and would locate and designate targets for the
attack helicopters laser guided Hellfire missiles.
In the air cavalry role, the AHIP provided an
increased capability to rapidly reconnoiter and maintain
surveillance over wide areas of the battlefield. They could
operate independently or in conjunction with ground cavalry,
or as part of a combined arms team.
In the field artillery aerial observer role, the AHIP
provided an aerial platform from which to adjust fire of
conventional and precision-guided munitions. The FAAO's
mission was to conduct battlefield reconnaissance to gather
target information in order to request and adjust indirect
fires
.
The OH-58D AHIP was developed in a single phase 42
month Engineering Development (ED) program under a contract
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with Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc. (BHTI) . The ED contract
was awarded in September 1981 and a development effort started
in November 1981. The mast-mounted site was subcontracted by
BHTI to McDonnell Douglas Astronautics Co. BHTI was totally
responsible for the overall system integration and system
performance. The OH-58D program schedule is depicted at
Figure 7
.
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Figure 7 OH-58D Kiowa Warrior Program Schedule (Source: Kiowa
Warrior Program Office)
The ED contract contained hardware ceiling prices
(negotiated downward only) for the planned first and second
year production quantities (16 in FY84, 44 in FY85)
.
Retention of these ceiling prices was contingent on timely
award of long lead and tooling contracts and award of full
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production contracts by 1 October 1984 for the first lot and
1 October 1985 for the second. The quantities for the first
two lots were established to provide a -reasonable ramp up to
a production rate of ten per month after three years. There
was no discussion of LRIP until the Milestone III (DSARCIII)
decision in October 1985.
According to the Program office personnel, there was
concurrency in the program in that production Long Lead Time
Items, Material and Effort (LLTIME) contracts and the first
production lot contract were awarded prior to the completion
of all Government testing. [Ref. 24] The LLTIME contract for
Lot number one was awarded in July 1983, tooling and
additional components and fabrication efforts were awarded in
February 1984 after substantial contractor flight test, and
the production contract was awarded 29 Sept 1984 after the
Government Development Test (DTI I) was completed. There was
no operational testing completed before the production
contract was awarded. LLTIME for lot number two was awarded
in August 19 84 after completion of the Government Preliminary
Airworthiness Evaluation and the Production Readiness Review.
These awards all took place before the Milestone III
decisions. Formal DA level IPR's were conducted and DA
approval was obtained prior to executing each award
[Ref. 24]
.
There were 578 AHIPs originally planned for
production. The Army obtained approval to buy only 179 after
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the October 1985 Secretary of Defense Decision Memo (SDDM)
which approved production for only one of the three roles.
There had already been 135 aircraft bought when the Army
attempted to terminate the program during its 19 88 budget
submission due primarily to budgetary considerations.
Congress voted to restore funds to buy 3 6 more aircraft in FY
1988. In August 1989 the AHIP concluded an ASARC IV which
approved funding for the armed OH-58D procurements. Table 3
indicates the program's milestone decision dates.
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October 1985 October 1985
(Source: OH-58D Kiowa Warrior Program Office)
2 . LRIP Planning
The AHIP helicopter had no formal LRIP strategy.
Since there was no formal strategy, no formal objectives were
established. A representative from the program office
described what the term LRIP meant to the program:
LRIP for the AHIP was defined as producing enough aircraft
to provide a reasonable ramp up to ten aircraft per month
after three years of production and was used for
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verification of production engineering, design maturity
and the establishment of a production base [Ref . 24]
.
The first lot of 16 AHIP aircraft was planned to
verify production engineering, design maturity and provide a
sufficient quantity of aircraft to complete operational
testing. The concerns with using the arbitrary number of 16
aircraft were twofold. First, the contractor was not involved
in the determination of the lot sizes to verify production
engineering. Secondly, the DOT&E was not involved in the
determination of the required quantity of aircraft for
testing.
The RFP requested a quotation for 24 aircraft for lot
number one and 56 aircraft for lot number two. But the
contract was for 16 aircraft in lot one and 44 aircraft in lot
two because these quantities were within the available
funding. [Ref. 24] This is another example of funding
constraints driving decisions instead of proper program
management decision making.
Since the Kiowa Warrior program was a modernization of
a current air vehicle, the program objectives were to
repackage and integrate available technologies into an
existing airframe. But there were several low to moderate
technology risks identified at the start of EMD. The first
lot of Kiowa Warriors was planned as the designated LRIP
articles with the intent of "proving out" the technology
risks. The technology risks identified were mission equipment
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and software integration, Mast Mounted Sight (MMS) vibration
levels above the rotor system, MMS boresight accuracy and
retention, engine certification schedule, and rotor dynamics
of the composite main rotor and hub system. [Ref. 24] An
October 12, 1993 memorandum from the DUSA(OR) to the DOT&E
indicated the request for a full material release for the
Kiowa Warrior was pending the results of additional testing.
The specific reasons cited were "that the autorotational
characteristics were unsatisfactory using the approved
techniques and the engine surges during rocket firing"
[Ref. 25]. Not surprisingly, these were two of the
five technology risks identified by the program office.
3 . Testing
There were two operational tests performed on the AHIP
aircraft. The first test compared the AHIP to the OH-58C.
The objective was to test the AHIP in all three of the roles
for which it was designed. A Beyond LRIP report, written at
the conclusion of the operational test, concluded that as
tested, the AHIP demonstrated an operationally effective
capability in only one of the three roles planned for it
(FAAO) . [Ref. 26] The DOT&E recommended that only a
conditional approval of limited production be authorized.
Based primarily on this assessment, a decision was made to
procure AHIPs only for the FAAO role. This meant that only
179 of the originally planned 578 AHIPs were approved for
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production. Had this report not been made on that first
production lot, the Army might have incurred expensive
retrofit costs or produced aircraft that could not perform
their intended missions.
The second operational test was the AHIP Follow-On
Test and Evaluation (FOT&E) . But before the test was
conducted, the Army cancelled production funds for any new
AHIPs. As a result, a new test objective was established and
the test was redesignated the Army Aerial Scout Test (AAST)
[Ref . 26] . The objective of the test was to compare
alternative candidate systems to the baseline AHIP. The
alternative candidates included the OH-58C, the OH-58C+ (0H-
58C with infrared sensors) , AH- IS Cobra (modernized) , and the
AH- 64 Apache.
Initially, both air cavalry and attack roles were
supposed to be tested, but only the air cavalry phase was
conducted. The results of this test indicated that the AHIP
was superior in locating enemy targets over all other scout
candidates. The test results were intended to refute the
DOT&E's claim that the AHIP could not perform all of its
intended missions.
The Kiowa Warrior evaluation concept involves
incorporating the previous operational and technical data
results of the OH- 58 AHIP germane to the Kiowa Warrior's
operational performance. This is planned to be accomplished
utilizing two FDTEs at Ft. Bragg and Ft. Hood. They will
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evaluate both operational effectiveness and operational
suitability using critical operational issues (COIs)
.
Production and conditional fielding are in progress. The
results of the FDTE's should insure a full materiel release.
4 . Summary
There was no formal LRIP strategy for the program.
Since the Kiowa Warrior technology advances were considered
evolutionary as opposed to revolutionary, the program office
chose not to include an LRIP phase. LRIP in this program
meant producing sufficient aircraft to provide a reasonable
ramp up for production. As a streamlining measure, a
production authorization resulted from the ASARCII decision.
There were only 16 aircraft in the first lot and 44 in
the second due to economic considerations and the desire to
have a reasonable ramp up to a production rate of ten per
month after three years. The original plan was for 24 in the
first lot and 56 in the second. The contractor was not
involved in the final decision even though he is responsible
for establishing the production base.
Only developmental testing was completed prior to the
first production lot of AHIPs. Operational testing was
completed sometime later. The testing community had no say as
to the number of aircraft required to support OT II. The
Kiowa Warrior evaluation issues that can not be evaluated
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using previous operational and technical data are anticipated
to be adequately addressed during the two FDTEs
.


























Figure 8 SOF Aircraft
The Army initiated the Special Operations Forces (SOF)
modification for the CH-47 Chinook and UH-60 Blackhawk
helicopters in 1986. This was in response to a DoD Special
Operations Forces Aircraft Report and a Special Operations
Expedite Essential Required Operational Capability (EEROC)
document. The program was officially established on 4 April
1986 and was based on a streamlined, Non-Major Acquisition
Category III, Non- Development Item Category III (some R&D)
,
Limited Procurement Urgent criteria [Ref. 29]. Table 4
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indicates the initial and most current program milestone
dates
.
TABLE 4 SOF MILESTONE DATES
SOF Initial Current
Program Initiation April 19 86 HQDA Message
Dem/Val
Milestone I
November 19 87 November 19 87
EMD
Milestone II
November 1987 November 19 87
LRIP
Milestone Ilia
Not Planned February 1990
Full Production
Milestone III
February 199 August 1991
(Source: SOA Program Office)
This strategy included significant internal and
external program dependencies along with concurrent
prototyping and production. A few of the dependencies
included conversion of the CH-47C to CH-47D (required prior to
MH-47E conversion) , modification of the T-712 engine to
provide 20 percent more horsepower and the 230 gallon external
fuel tank for the MH-60K. Because of the cancellation of some
of the dependent DoD programs, which increased the Special
Operations Aircraft (SOA) program costs above the ACAT III
threshold of $75M R&D/$300M production, the program was
designated an ACAT II [Ref . 27]
.
The Program provides 26 MH-47E and 23 MH-60K for the
United States Special .Operations Command (USSOCOM) and, in
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particular, for the Army's 160th Special Operations Aviation
Regiment, (SOAR) Airborne. The SOA Program modifies Army
CH-47D and UH-60K helicopters to perform clandestine, deep
penetration airlift missions in adverse weather, with limited
lighting and visibility during night or day conditions, over
all types of terrain [Ref. 28]. Typical SOF targets
include, but are not limited to, nuclear delivery systems, C3
facilities, logistic centers, and key structures such as
bridges and railroads [Ref. 28].
A Government competitive selection was made for the
Integrated Avionics Subsystem (IAS) which constituted the
single most significant portion of the program. The aircraft
development and qualification efforts were then obtained
through engineering change proposals (ECPs) to the existing
aircraft multi-year contracts with the aircraft manufacturers.
The major responsibility for the management and execution of
the program is placed with the prime contractors who have
Total System Performance Responsibility (TSPR) . This TSPR
means that the airframe prime contractors (Boeing Helicopter
and Sikorsky Aircraft) have the responsibility for the
performance of the total system which includes the airframe
and the Mission Equipment Package (MEP) [Ref. 29].
The sought after SOA technology is based on four
primary functions that must be integrated together to ensure
program success. The first two consist of upgrading the
existing CH-47D and UH-60L airframes and the T55-L-714 engine
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for 20 percent more horsepower while inserting the latest
technology Full Authority Digital Electronic Control. The
third function is to adapt the latest technology digital
Integrated Avionics Subsystem with advanced Terrain
Following/Avoidance Radar and FLIR. The fourth function is
inserting the latest technology SOF mission equipment packages
such as air-to-air refueling, range extension kits, and mini-
guns [Ref . 27] . The overall program is about one year behind
schedule because of the event driven decision process rather
than the classical calendar approach.
2 . LRIP Planning
The SOA program entered LRIP because the production
base for the conversion of the CH-47C to the CH-47D, which
provides the input configuration to the MH-47E, was going to
terminate, and the requisites for a full production decision
were not complete [Ref. 27]. Additionally, since all the
classical Milestone II elements had not been completed by the
scheduled Milestone III decision point, a Milestone Ilia was
injected to authorize LRIP for the first 11 aircraft of each
type. At the same time, the authorization for long leadtime
procurement was made for the remainder of the fleet. Had the
decision not been made to start limited production, the
schedule would have been extended two years and costs would
have increased by $50M [Ref. 27].
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A second LRIP decision was made at Milestone III based
on the successful completion of some technical tests,
logistics demonstrations and the desire to avoid a break in
the production line. The additional LRIP quantities included
the entire MH-60K (11 additional) requirement and an
additional 14 MH-47E (25 total) aircraft. A program
management official commenting on the rationale for utilizing
a second LRIP decision, which produced almost the entire
planned production amount, stated, "considering the facts that
such a limited fleet, for an urgently needed capability, for
a single user, was involved, this became an obvious decision"
[Ref . 27]
.
The one thing that was obvious was the fact that the
requisites for full production were not, or could not be met,
and the program management office intended to field the system
using LRIP. The SOA program office believes that the most
important aspects of the LRIP approach are to control risks
and exposure while maintaining program continuity and
minimizing costs.
The initial LRIP quantities were based on training,
testing and production continuity considerations. The
contractors were involved to the extent of providing
information on manpower and facility loading and cost impacts
of various alternatives. The second LRIP quantities were
based on production continuity, fleet size, and funding
availability. The PEO Aviation made the initial decision for
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LRIP. The second LRIP decision was made by the PEO with the
knowledge and consent of the Army Acquisition Executive (AAE)
and the User. Figures 9 and 10 show the milestones and the
developmental and operational testing schedules.
3. Testing
FY 93
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Figure 9 MH-47E Program Schedule (Source: SOA Program Office)
Originally, the Army decided that since the
modifications of the helicopters were considered non-
development items, it would perform little developmental and
no operational testing. This decision was based on the
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premise that the helicopters used were already qualified
systems and the planned testing and evaluation would consist
of integrating and testing already -qualified components
[Ref. 30]. However, based on discussions with the
DOT&E, it was decided that the acquisition and testing
strategies for both helicopters should be restructured to


























































Figure 10 MH-60K Program Schedule (Source: SOA Program office)
The schedules indicate that prototypes of both the MH-
47E and the MH-60K were returned to the plant for a software
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update and Integrated Avionics Subsystems production hardware.
The technical tests associated with this integration were
completed in March 1993. Additionally, the testing schedule
indicates that the SOA aircraft have a complete array of
production, technical and operational tests planned into the
program. There is a 50 hour preliminary assessment (Phase 1)
designed to look at operational effectiveness and suitability
of the aircraft in realistic operational environments. The
intent is to determine the potential for the system to satisfy
critical operational issues (COIs)
.
Following this is an operational assessment (Phase II)
which is a detailed assessment of the operational
effectiveness and suitability for use by typical users in
realistic operational environments. The intent of this
assessment is to determine the degree to which the system'
s
COIs have been satisfied. Unfortunately, the operational
testing will be accomplished after the production decision is
made so any problems encountered and required fixes will not
be addressed.
4. Summary
The Special Operations Aircraft program office
employed LRIP as a method of shortening the acquisition cycle
for a relatively small production run. This was accomplished
because the acquisition regulations never envisioned the
concurrent acquisition for such a specialized limited quantity
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of end items . The primary reason the SOA program entered LRIP
was to ensure there was no break in the production line.
Since the requirements for full production had not been
achieved, LRIP was inserted to bridge the gap. Had this not
been used, the program would have slipped two years and
increased in cost approximately $50M.
The PEO, PM and User selected the quantities for the
LRIP phases. Contractors were involved only for cost analysis
of various alternatives. The testing community had little
input into the quantity decision. The initial and extended
LRIP quantities were primarily based on production continuity
and funding considerations.
Operational testing is being accomplished to ensure
the system functions as intended. One problem noticed with
the operational testing strategy is that a large percentage of
the aircraft have already been awarded the production decision
via two LRIP awards prior to the results of the testing.
E. RAH- 66 COMANCHE
1. Program Status
The RAH- 66 Comanche is envisioned to be a lightweight,
twin engine, advanced technology helicopter that will replace
the Army's current light helicopter fleet. The current light
fleet includes the AH-1 Cobra, the OH- 6 Cayuse, and the 0H-
58A/C Kiowa helicopters. The Comanche will perform armed
reconnaissance and attack missions in the close, deep and rear
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battle environments. Air combat
operations will be an inherent
capability and the Comanche will
be equally effective on the
linear and non- linear battlefield
across the operational continuum
[Ref. 31] .
The Comanche is intended
to correct major light fleet Figure 11 RAH- 66 Comanche
deficiencies such as marginal night and adverse weather
capability, location/navigation inaccuracies, and inability to
self -deploy to overseas theaters. Comanche system
improvements will include lightweight composite airframe
structures, protected anti- torque systems, high- reliability
rotor systems, reduced signature, and built-in diagnostics/
prognostics [Ref. 31].
Concept Exploration was initiated with preliminary
study efforts in 1983. These efforts provided the necessary
technical information and confidence required to verify
concept feasibility and define the system's operational
requirements. Competitive preliminary design contracts were
awarded to Bell Helicopter Textron, Boeing/Vertol (now Boeing
Helicopters) , Hughes Helicopters (now McDonnell Douglas
Helicopter Co), and Sikorsky Aircraft in September 1983.
These studies included investigation of concepts and designs
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of derivative helicopters, advanced technology conventional
helicopters, and other various advanced helicopters [Ref. 31] .
Competitive Dem/Val contracts i were awarded to the
Boeing/Sikorsky and the McDonnell/Bell contractor teams in
November 1988. The focus of the initial competitive Dem/Val
phase was to define the Mission Equipment Package (MEP) and
electronics architecture; demonstrate performance of key MEP
components with brassboard and breadboard hardware; and define
performance requirements for a lightweight helicopter through
design analyses and selected demonstrations [Ref. 31] . Table
5 indicates the initial and most current schedule estimates
for the program milestones.
TABLE 5 COMANCHE MILESTONE DATES
Comanche Initial Current
Program Initiation June 19 83 JMSNS
Dem/Val
Milestone I
December 1988 April 1991
EMD
Milestone II
January 1991 November 199 7
LRIP
Milestone Ilia
November 1994 September 2000
Full Production
Milestone III
November 199 6 November 2002
ISource: Comanche Program Office]
The Dem/Val phase Source Selection Plan (SSP) was
approved by the Source Selection Authority (SSA) on 23 April
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199 and the request for proposal (RFP) was released on 1 May
1990. Proposals were received from both industry teams on 31
August 1990. After months of proposal evaluations and
negotiations, Boeing/Sikorsky was announced as the winning
contractor team on 5 April 1992.
The Comanche is currently being developed as an ACAT
ID program. The development program consists of an extended
Dem/Val Prototype phase (78 months versus 54 months) as
required by Department of Defense budget constraints. The
primary objectives of the Dem/Val Prototype phase are to
complete the aircraft design, build prototype aircraft, and
conduct a flight test program to reduce risk and demonstrate
that the system is ready to continue development.
The DoD budget constraints are a result of the January
1992 funding restrictions instituted by the President's FY 93
budget. The SECDEF directed the Comanche program to submit a
plan to restructure its development contracts to prove out all
critical components, including avionics, an upgraded T800
engine, and the Longbow radar system within available funding.
The resubmitted plan included extending the Dem/Val Prototype
phase an additional two years and reductions in the number of
prototype aircraft built. Figure 12 shows the original
program schedule as well as the restructured schedule.
Because of the deferral of EMD and production, there may no
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Figure 12 RAH-66 Program Schedule (Source: Comanche Program Office)
Should a decision be made in the future to proceed
beyond Dem/Val , an EMD phase of approximately 4 8 months would
be required prior to entering production. The total
production buy is currently planned at between 1681 and 1292
helicopters
.
It is obvious, by the extension of the Dem/Val
prototype phase, that the risk reduction effort is very
important to the program. The Comanche faces many development
challenges. According to the Deputy Program Manager, the most
difficult technical challenges in the overall Comanche
development program will be meeting the Low Observable (LO)
requirements, integrating the MEP into the aircraft, achieving
mandated cost and weight requirements, and software
integration [Ref. 32]. In meeting these challenges,
the Comanche Program has planned an LRIP strategy designed to
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provide an early chance to evaluate production configuration
aircraft to insure they provide the required capabilities
prior to full rate production.
2 . LRIP Planning
The Comanche program has planned to use an LRIP
strategy since its inception. Through the use of LRIP, both
the producibility of the Comanche and its production
representative performance can be validated prior to the MS
III decision.
The objectives of the Comanche LRIP program are in
conformity with the DoD instructions. The program plans to
enter LRIP to demonstrate that the production processes and
techniques are capable of producing aircraft at the required
rate and level of quality. Secondly, it provides production
representative aircraft to be used for completion of
development activities, critical operational assessments, and
validation of logistics concepts. Thirdly, it validates the
producible quality of the Comanche design.
The quantity of LRIP aircraft was determined by the
Program Manager, the AAE and the DUSA(OR) (at the time of the
decision, the program was reporting directly to the AAE and
was not under the PEO structure) According to the Deputy
Program Manager, 48 aircraft will be built as LRIP articles,
24 per year, for two years, at a production rate of two per
month [Ref . 32] . This quantity was chosen in order to provide
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eight production representative aircraft for IOT&E. The
contractor was involved from the standpoint of how and when
LRIP would be implemented to provide for a smooth transition
into production, but was not involved in any quantity
decisions
.
The Comanche Program has undergone many changes since
program inception. During the 1988 restructure, the LRIP
decision was scheduled for November 1994, almost two years
before the EMD phase was scheduled to be completed. This
would have resulted in less accurate information from which to
make a proper LRIP decision. All this has now changed as a
result of the 1992 restructure in that an LRIP decision is not
scheduled to be made until after EMD. Currently, the Program
is undergoing another streamlining effort. The results of
this effort may again change the LRIP strategy.
Preliminary results of the Comanche streamline effort
indicate that a production long lead authorization and an LRIP
decision are planned for November 1998. The LRIP quantities
were reduced from 48 to 12. This again is a funding decision
since the program is selling the streamlined acquisition
strategy as "efficiencies resulting in RDT&E and procurement
savings" [Ref. 33].
3 . Testing
According to the Comanche Test and Evaluation Master
Plan, the primary purposes of OT&E are to ensure that the
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Comanche is operationally effective and operationally
suitable, and that it meets the mission needs and minimum
operational performance requirements of the operating forces
[Ref. 34]. To accomplish this, the Comanche test program
encompasses a variety of efforts designed to reduce the user's
concern.
During the Concept Exploration phase, user involvement
was incorporated into the Advanced Rotorcraft Technology
Integration (ARTI) program. A team of four US Army Forces
Command (FORSCOM) and US Army Aviation Center (USAAVNC) pilots
were made available to support the Comanche (at the time it
was known as the LHX) cockpit simulations and flight testing.
[Ref. 34]
A second segment of user participation was the
Simulation Assessment Team (SAT) . The SAT provided a group of
suitably qualified pilots to further compare the contractors'
simulation against a common standard. A Government Composite
Mission Scenario (GCMS) was designed and used as the common
standard. The SAT visited each contractor facility and
reviewed the adequacy of each contractor's simulation to
validate their workload and equipment analysis. [Ref. 34]
There were no formal operational assessments or evaluations
conducted, but operational -like data were collected and
reported to the SSEB.
During the initial Dem/Val phase, the testing focused
primarily on the development and integration of the MEP and
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the electronics systems architecture. The intent was for
early identification, isolation and reduction system technical
risk by hardware demonstration and progressive system
integration.
The Dem/Val prototype phase has the Comanche
incorporating the Longbow radar system and an upgraded T80
engine. The test program will utilize three prototype
aircraft and will entail a Government/contractor combined test
team approach. This approach is designed to ensure the
demonstration of critical technologies and that airworthiness
and structural test requirements are met. [Ref. 31] As
currently envisioned, once approval is received to enter the
EMD phase, three additional prototype aircraft will be built
and tested.
As for the future, the Army plans to conduct a series
of tests and experiments in support of the development effort.
The Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) and the Test and
Experimentation Command (TEXCOM) will use the Early
Operational Capability (EOC) unit to conduct a series of three
Force Development Test and Experimentations (FDTEs) [Ref. 34] .
FDTE I will explore existing armed reconnaissance and attack
tactics in a variety of Comanche mission scenarios. FDTE II
will evaluate selected tactics, techniques and procedures
(TTPs) from FDTE I to emphasize team tactics. FDTE III will
be a force-on-force, networked combined arms exercise to
assess the effectiveness of the previously developed Comanche
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TTPs. Due to system immaturity, these operational assessments
are not planned to support an LRIP decision but will focus on
mission performance functions such as target detection,
acquisition, location, and reporting [Ref. 32].
The currently planned EMD phase will conclude with the
conduct of an IOT&E of approximately 9 days and 750-1200
flight hours [Ref. 34] . TEXCOM will conduct the test with EOC
personnel flying and maintaining LRIP aircraft. The resulting
data will support the Milestone III Production decision. The
preliminary streamlining effort indicates that four prototype
aircraft will complete flight testing between November 1995
and January 2001. There is currently no available information
of the type of operational testing planned for the new
streamlined LRIP aircraft.
4. Summary
Because the Comanche is considered to be a major
innovative technological system, the acquisition strategy
incorporated the use of an LRIP phase. The LRIP strategy and
the program' s planned implementation of it was in conformity
with the DoD instructions.
DoD Instruction 5000.2 requires that LRIP quantities
be limited to certain criteria. This guidance provides a
great deal of latitude to the program office in determining
their LRIP quantity. In the case of the Comanche, the
quantity of LRIP aircraft planned has been the same even
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though the total production buy has decreased. When the LRIP
quantities were established, the total production was 2,096.
In 1991 the production number was reduced to between 1,641 and
1,292 aircraft. Preliminary data available on the
streamlining of the Comanche suggest a reduction in the LRIP
quantities. As with the previous systems, the contractors
were not involved in the determination of the final LRIP
quantities but instead, from the standpoint of how and when
LRIP should be implemented. As a result of the Comanche
streamlining effort, the total LRIP quantities were reduced to
12 aircraft. Primary reasons for the reduction were to keep
the program dollars within cost constraints.
The testing program for the Comanche is extensive.
During the restructure, the number of prototypes available for
tests was reduced from six to three, but the hours dedicated
for those tests increased. This seems to affirm that the
program intends to reduce as much as possible the inherent
risks of a new system before production. As a result of
streamlining, the number of prototypes was increased from
three to four with no increase in dedicated test hours.
The operational assessments will utilize the Early
Operational Capability unit to explore tactics in a variety of
Comanche missions. Early user involvement should assist the





The use of Low Rate Initial Production as part of any
acquisition strategy can provide many benefits if properly
planned and implemented. The research indicates that although
regulations and the guidance concerning LRIP are provided to
program managers, they are at best vague and confusing.
This chapter will present an analysis of significant
issues based upon a review of DoD's acquisition policies and
the investigation of the selected Army Aviation systems.
B. SIGNIFICANT ISSUES
1. A Change in the Current Acquisition Culture
When the Cold War ended, it brought to a close almost
45 years of a national security policy dominated by the threat
posed by a communist regime. The acquisition culture was that
of threat driven requirements. Once a perceived enemy's new
system was discovered, our policy dictated that we produce
something bigger, faster and better. Along with those
requirements, the system needed to be fielded with the utmost
urgency. After the threat driven requirements were aggregated
into force structure scenarios, Operational Requirements
Documents were developed.
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This threat driven paradigm is now gone. No longer
can we base system development on an impending threat and
utilize high risk strategies such as concurrency. The
acquisition strategy for the AH- 64 Apache illustrated this
point, featuring an accelerated development schedule and no
incorporation of an LRIP phase. A paradigm shift away from a
threat driven scenario and into more of a goal oriented
scenario is needed.
A second reason for change results from the current
practice of penalizing program managers for exhibiting
integrity. When technical problems are encountered and
reported during development of a high risk system, the program
is in jeopardy of termination. Program managers are placed in
a situation of conflicting requirements. On the one hand,
they must be champions of the cause, defending their programs
from critics and adversaries.
On the other hand, they are guardians of trust and
must be truthful in assessing the risks of their programs,
even to the program's detriment. This can lead to reduced
testing, providing meaningless and easily attainable exit
criteria, or the procurement of much larger quantities of LRIP
articles than are truly necessary.
Additionally, problems encountered early in a
development phase can give critics ample ammunition with which
to "shoot down" the program. Critics often forget that high-
tech programs are not without risk.
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Two of the four programs reviewed displayed symptoms
of the prevailing acquisition culture. The Comanche program
has been restructured, reshuffled, and reprogrammed because of
risk. One program response is to plan on producing 4 8 LRIP
articles to ensure that eight are available for IOT&E. This
seems to be an excessive amount, but not unrealistic
considering the current culture. The SOA program plans to
produce more than three quarters of its total buy as LRIP
articles. Again, this is a much larger amount than required
to meet the criteria established by DoD Instruction 5000.2.
Some officials believe that if enough systems are produced
early, the inertia alone will keep production going. Although
most economists believe that sunk costs are irrelevant when
deciding whether to continue spending money, many politicians
believe the contrary. As long as this paradigm exists,
programs will continue to use tactics that run counter to the
intent of regulations. The acquisition process can no longer




The revised DoD Directive 5000.1 and the implementing
DoD Instruction 5000.2 do not provide adequate oversight
regarding the minimum program accomplishments needed before
proceeding into LRIP. There is limited oversight to ensure a
stable design or production readiness. Additionally, the
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programs themselves decide what exit criteria if any, need to
be demonstrated in order to proceed with an LRIP. The exit
criteria for decision points are suggested but not required by
DoD Instruction 5000.2.
Specifically, DoD Instruction 5000.2 fails to provide
oversight on these important considerations:
• Minimum program accomplishments required before entering
LRIP to ensure a stable design exists, test results
support proceeding with the production decision and
readiness for production has been confirmed;
• Establishment of program specific exit criteria for
initiation of long lead funding for LRIP, entry into LRIP
and award of subsequent production lots; and
• Milestone decision authority reviews of program status and
accomplishments, including reaffirmation of the LRIP
quantities and acquisition strategy before entering LRIP
[Ref . 15]
.
DoD Instruction 5000.2 provides little guidance on
determining the appropriate amount of articles designated as
LRIP. The guidance indicates that LRIP quantities should be
limited to the minimum required for IOT&E, to establish an
initial production base and to permit an orderly increase in
the production rate sufficient to lead to full -rate
production. There is no formal guideline concerning the
acceptable LRIP quantity versus the total planned production
quantities. This guidance is very broad and it allows
programs the flexibility to decide on an amount which may be
based on factors unrelated to the DoD regulations or their
intent. Bounds should be established to assist program
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managers when determining an appropriate number of LRIP
articles
.
The SOA program is a good example of this deficiency.
An LRIP decision was established only to keep the production
line open. The SOA program entered LRIP because the
production base for the conversion of the CH-47C to the CH-
47D, which provides the input configuration to the MH-47E, was
going to terminate and the requisites for a full production
decision were not complete.
The Apache program entered operational testing with
intended design changes on its LRIP aircraft (Lot one) .
Production representative aircraft were not used. Instead,
the operational test was performed with aircraft which
included key subsystems that were planned to be redesigned
after completion of the tests. While additional oversight for
LRIP will not substitute for sound program management, the
level of oversight does affect the focus of program
management
.
3 . Contractor and Test Communities Involvement in
Determining LRIP Quantities
As previously mentioned, the guidance indicates that
LRIP quantities should be limited to the minimum required for
IOT&E, to establish an initial production base and to permit
an orderly increase in the production rate sufficient to lead
to full -rate production. In the Longbow Apache, OH-58D Kiowa
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Warrior and the SOA programs, the determination of the number
of LRIP articles was based strictly on budget considerations.
Contractor participation was limited to cost analysis and LRIP
timing decisions. In the case of the SOA program, the
quantities were based primarily on production line continuity
and there was little involvement from the testing community.
In only one case, the OH-58D, was the testing community
involved in the quantity determination. Ironically, this was
the only program that did not have an LRIP strategy as part of
its acquisition strategy. Since the contractor is responsible
for two of the three LRIP quantity determination factors, more
involvement is justified.
4. LRIP Phasing Effects on Program Costs
An aspect of increased costs arises when the use of
LRIP defers the unit production costs to later years when
inflation, labor rates and overhead rates are higher.
Additionally, LRIP permits the opportunity for Follow- on Test
and Experimentation which delays the full -rate production
decision. This again results in higher unit costs and
ultimately higher total program costs.
The Longbow Apache program was impacted not by the
decision to have an LRIP but when to conduct it. The Longbow
Apache LRIP decision is scheduled one year after the DAB
approval and has, according to the Product Manager,
significantly increased costs for the three program contracts.
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The SOA program faced different circumstances
regarding LRIP and cost increases. Since LRIP was not a
planned strategy from the outset, but*' only incorporated to
keep the production line operating until all production
requirements were met, the use of LRIP saved the program
money. Had the decision been made not to start LRIP and the
production line shut down, the schedule would have been
extended two years and the costs would have increased by $50M.
In terms of costs, LRIP may be construed as a "double edged
sword"
.
5. Completion of Initial Testing
Testing programs are designed to provide the decision
makers with the data necessary to make intelligent and
informed decisions. It is imperative that both development
and operational testing be complete prior to making an LRIP
decision. Making production decisions prior to the completion
of testing has the potential for disastrous consequences.
In the case of the OH-58D, only development testing
was accomplished prior to the decision to proceed with
production lot one. When operational testing was completed,
the results indicated that the aircraft had demonstrated an
operationally effective capability in only one of the three
mission roles planned. As a result, the DOT&E only
recommended production for the FAAO role.
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The SOA strategy indicates that the program plans
production concurrent with developmental testing and before
operational testing. This concurrency is considered feasible
by the program office because the upgrades are only
modifications of previously fielded systems. It is considered
more of an NDI strategy than a new development program.
The Longbow Apache testing program is more
comprehensive than the AH- 64 Apache. The testing program
indicates the Longbow Apache will conduct initial operational
testing prior to the LRIP decision using production
representative aircraft. In contrast, the Apache operational
testing did not utilize production representative aircraft and
was not conducted in a realistic environment. LRIP decisions
made prior to the completion of testing can significantly
increase the risk of large retrofit costs should a system not
meet its operational requirements.
6 . Concurrent Development and Production
Current acquisition policies can result in a void
between phases in the acquisition cycle. The void is most
pronounced between the development and production phases
because production should not be initiated until all
engineering is reasonably complete and all significant design
problems have been identified with corresponding solutions.
Concurrent acquisition strategies, if accomplished
effectively, have the potential to save time and money.
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Unfortunately, the converse is true when too much concurrency-
is planned and entry into LRIP is premature. The results are
usually expensive retrofits and fielding delays as was the
case with the AH- 64 Apache. When programs adhere to an
orderly and sequential design, test and evaluation, and a
clear separation of development and production, many benefits
may accrue. One such benefit is that it bounds the
Government's risk by preventing the initiation of a costly
manufacturing program before all engineering problems are
solved and the design is proven.
The AH- 64 Apache provides a good example of why
concurrency should be avoided. The strategy of concurrency
allowed it to entered production with an immature design and
with a logistic support concept that could not be
demonstrated. This decision cost the Government in terms of
low availability rates and expensive retrofits.
Reducing concurrency allows the time for incorporation
of required changes that surface as a result of development
and operational testing. The OH- 5 8 provides insight into this
area. An argument can be made that had the OH- 58 AHIP program
been slowed down and an LRIP phase incorporated, the need to
retrofit AHIPs into Kiowa Warriors may have been averted. The
fact that only developmental testing was completed prior to
the first production lot indicates that the program had no
intention of relying on the results of operational testing
which might have indicated the requirement to be fully armed.
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Reducing concurrency can also be seen as an attempt to
improve the predictability of cost, schedule and performance
factors. It presents a more conservative face to the Congress
which must approve commitment of funds for system production.
All of the aviation systems analyzed can benefit from this,
but the Comanche program offers the best example.
The program has undergone many changes since program
inception. As a result of the 1992 restructure, all
production funds were withdrawn from the program and the
Dem/Val phase was extended two additional years in order to
reduce risk. As recently as the December 1993 streamlining
effort, some production funding has been restored to the
program which indicates confidence that some of the high risk
has been mitigated.
It would be naive to believe that allowing for a
planned production gap would be the answer to all acquisition
problems. There are some potential impacts that might
negatively affect a program.
As mentioned earlier, during periods when there is a
high rate of inflation, a long gap would severely escalate the
costs of a system. Depending on whether the program is
evolutionary as opposed to revolutionary (Comanche versus
Kiowa Warrior) , a cost benefit analysis might indicate
concurrency as the optimal solution. A second and more
political reason is that delaying production invites critics
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to converge upon the program and increases the possibility of
program termination.
7. Affordability Considerations' on LRIP Quantity
Decisions
Funding constraints seem to be the primary
consideration used when program offices establish the quantity
of aircraft desired for LRIP. It appears that political
concerns provide the rationale when determining a viable
quantity for LRIP. Even programs that abide by the DoD
guidance in establishing the quantities of LRIP articles are
not shielded from the budget axe.
According to the Apache Program office, the initial
production quantity was based solely on affordability
considerations. There were 15 aircraft planned as the initial
production quantity but the number was reduced to 11 based
upon a "Should Cost" determination of available funds and
subsequent negotiations with the prime contractor.
Information obtained from the Longbow Apache program
office indicated that 24 aircraft were planned for LRIP with
a contract award scheduled for November 1995. This number was
established in June 1992 and derived from budget/POM drills
and the reductions in the Army's Total Obligation Authority
(TOA)
.
Both the PM and contractor preferred a larger number
ranging between 36 and 48 in order to meet the contractor's
established minimum sustaining rate.
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The OH-58D Kiowa Warrior program offers another
example of funding constraints driving decisions instead of
proper program management decision making. The initial
request was for 24 aircraft for lot number one and 56 aircraft
for lot number two. The resultant contract was for 16
aircraft in lot one and 44 aircraft in lot two because these
quantities were within the available funding lines.
Only the SOA program's initial LRIP quantities were
based on training, testing and production continuity
considerations. The second LRIP quantities were based on
production continuity, fleet size, and funding availability.
The Comanche program offers the final example of
budget constraints. The LRIP quantities were reduced from 48
to 12 base upon the preliminary streamlined strategy. This is
believed to be a funding decision since the program is selling
the streamlined acquisition strategy as "efficiencies"
resulting in RDT&E and procurement savings. Funding
constraints should be part of the program management decision
making process, not a replacement for it.
C. SUMMARY
This chapter provided an analysis of significant issues
which were both DoD programmatic as well as aviation system
peculiar. The issues span the spectrum from general
acquisition reform, in which cultural transformation is
needed, to inadequate oversight when planning for LRIP and
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identification of the strengths and weaknesses of acquisition
strategies. The issues were chosen because of their direct
correlation with all or most of the systems analyzed.
The following chapter will derive conclusions from the
analysis and provide recommendations to remedy some of the
more prominent problems. A suggestion of areas for further
research will follow the recommendations.
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VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. CONCLUSIONS
I. General Conclusion
Low Rate Initial Production, as it is currently being
implemented, is not ensuring that the risks of transitioning
from development to production are adequately addressed. To
minimize the risks of transitioning from development to LRIP
in a non- threat driven environment, several prerequisites
should be met. These prerequisites include: minimizing as
much as possible any unresolved deficiencies resulting from
development testing, ensuring the successful completion of
operational testing on production representative articles and
basing LRIP decisions on systems with a mature design.
Prototype systems may be used as LRIP articles provided they
represent the final aircraft configuration.
LRIP, in most cases, is being used to secure a
production commitment. Some aviation systems are entering
LRIP before they are ready, utilizing multiple LRIP awards to
keep production lines open. With changing threat conditions
and decreased defense dollars, total aircraft buys are being
reduced. The combination of multiple LRIP production awards
and the reduced overall buys increases the risk of over
commitment to production.
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DoD Instruction 5000.2 is not specific when addressing
the quantities necessary for initial operational test and
evaluation, establishment of a production base, or an orderly-
increase to a full -rate production. Furthermore, 5000.2 is
vague regarding the requirements necessary for entry into
LRIP. This escalates the potential for abuse of the intent of
LRIP and again increases the risk of over commitment to
production.
2. Specific Conclusions
Funding constraints and test articles are the major
LRIP quantity determinants. In all cases analyzed, funding
decisions drove the number of LRIP articles. These funding
decisions took into account the required number of systems for
operational testing but not for the establishment of a
production base or an orderly increase to full rate
production. This was evident by the lack of contractor
involvement in the final LRIP quantity decision.
Premature entry into LRIP is a systemic deficiency in
acquisition oversight. Present guidance provided by DoD
Instruction 5000.2 is intended to provide flexibility in
structuring LRIP within a program's acquisition strategy to
accommodate the unique aspects of individual programs. This
invites the opportunity for programs to enter LRIP when
production prerequisites have not been met. While additional
oversight for LRIP will not substitute for sound program
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management, the level of oversight does affect the focus of
program management
.
Acquisition reform by itself i's not enough. There
needs to be a cultural revolution in terms of program
acquisition requirements. Many of the past reforms have been
created to correct the most well recognized acquisition
problems, such as developing more accurate cost estimates,
enhancing stability, improving the quality of the acquisition
workforce, etc. The success of these reforms has been limited
because the embedded culture, which proliferates parochial
preferences, still exists.
There is a proliferation in the required number of
LRIP systems. Current guidance indicates that LRIP quantities
should be limited to the minimum required for IOT&E, to
establish an initial production base and to permit an orderly
increase in the production rate sufficient to lead to full-
rate production. There is no formal guideline concerning the
acceptable LRIP quantity versus the total planned production
quantities. The potential for excessive LRIP quantities
occurs because production lines continue as solutions are
sought for technical problems.
The use of LRIP can increase program costs. The
potential for increased costs occurs when the use of LRIP
defers the unit production costs to later years when
inflation, labor rates, overhead rates are higher.
Additionally, the use of LRIP permits the opportunity for
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Follow- on Test and Experimentation to delay the full -rate
production decision, resulting in higher unit costs and
ultimately higher total program costs. LRIP is not a panacea
for program managers. In some cases LRIP may actually
increase costs instead of reducing them.
There is no policy for the commitment of long lead
funding to support LRIP. The long lead funding decision point
represents the commitment of funds to initiate production
related decisions. With no policy established, commitment of
these funds rests with the program management organization's
determination of the contractor's production readiness. There
is no requirement to verify completion of predetermined exit
criteria. Consequently, commitment of funds cannot be
objectively evaluated.
The use of LRIP requires the need to invest in
manufacturing tooling and test equipment earlier in the
acquisition lifecycle. This can prove to be very costly to
both industry and Government should unforeseen political or
threat conditions require program redirection.
Concurrency increases the risk that systems will be
produced with major flaws. In today's environment, the risk
outweighs the benefits of fielding a system early. If
concurrency is deemed a necessary part of the acquisition
strategy, adequate safeguards must be built into the
development process to mitigate the risk.
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B . RECOMMENDATIONS
There are several recommendations that can be drawn from
the previous conclusions. The following are specific
recommendations that the Under Secretary of Defense for
Acquisition and Technology should consider through the
revision of DoD Instruction 5000.2.
LRIP should be established as a separate acquisition
milestone. Because of the number of program changes that can
occur between Milestone II and the LRIP decision, a
verification of LRIP requirements needs to be established.
This will ensure that LRIP is fully supported by program
accomplishments and that the LRIP quantities are properly
defined based on program needs.
Initial development and operational testing should be
completed prior to the LRIP decision. LRIP decisions made
prior to the completion of testing can significantly increase
the risk of large retrofit costs should a system not meet its
operational requirements.
Program specific exit criteria should be established
before entry into LRIP. More oversight is essential on the
required program accomplishments for initially committing long
lead procurement funding for LRIP and entry into LRIP.
Accomplishment of production readiness reviews, completion of
developmental testing and operational testing prerequisites
should be mandatory before making LRIP decisions. A better
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relationship between the systems engineering concepts and LRIP
decisions are needed.
More oversight regarding the minimum required LRIP
quantities should be provided. As the requirement currently
exists, the minimum LRIP quantities are based on the articles
necessary for test and evaluation, establishment of a
production base, and an orderly increase to a full rate
production. It is relatively easy to identify items needed
for test and evaluation. The ambiguity emerges when
identifying quantities to fulfill establishment of a
production base and an orderly increase to a full rate
production. In order to obtain a more accurate figure, the
three determinants of LRIP quantities should be identified
separately and not aggregated together. The Milestone II
Decision Authority can make the final decision based upon
current political, threat or economic conditions.
C. AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH
The following areas should be investigated for potential
benefit to DoD:
• Reengineering of the Acquisition Process - There are a
significant number of issues that could be explored in
this rapidly changing environment. Reengineering differs
from reforming in that reengineering is the process of
identifying and discarding the outdated rules and
fundamental assumptions that currently exist. Reforming
is simply making incremental changes to "improve" the
existing process.
• Virtual Prototyping and Virtual Manufacturing - The
potential capabilities for increased cost efficiency and
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reduced risk for program development have just begun to be
realized. With virtual prototypes, design and
manufacturing tradeoffs can be evaluated.
• Defense Science and Technology Strategy - One of the
primary objectives of this acquisition approach is to
conduct more rigorous up front technology developments so
that the formal acquisition cycle can be made less risky.
Areas such as the Advanced Technology Demonstration offer
potential for validating the viability and producibility
of a technology.
• Concurrent Engineering - Preliminary research indicates
that this approach could reduce design time and cost by as
much as 35 percent and total life cycle costs by as much
as 45 percent. There is a significant need for directed,
focused research in this area.
• Test and Evaluation - The Director, Operational Test and
Evaluation, established the Operational Test and
Evaluation Capability Improvement Program to acquire test
resources for improving the realism of operational tests.
Research into the benefits and shortcomings of this
program could provide program managers information that
may assist in making key acquisition decisions, especially
the decision to proceed from development to production.
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LIST OF ACRONYMS
10 USC Title 10, United States Code
AAE Army Acquisition Executive
AMSAA Army Materiel Systems Analysis Activity
ACAT Acquisition Category
ADM Acquisition Decision Memorandum
AH Attack Helicopter
AHIP Advanced Helicopter Improvement Program
ARTI Advanced Rotorcraft Technology Integration
ASARC Army System Acquisition Review Council
ATCOM Aviation and Troop Command
BHTI Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc
BLRIP Beyond Low Rate Initial Production
CE Concept Exploration .
CH Cargo Helicopter
CTT Combined Test Team
DA Department of the Army
DAB Defense Acquisition Board
DAE Defense Acquisition Executive
Dem/Val Demonstration/Validation
DLSIE Defense Logistics Studies Information Exchange
DoD Department of Defense
DOT&E Director, Operational Test and Evaluation
DSARC Defense Systems Acquisition Review Council
DT Development Testing
DUSA-OR Deputy Under Secretary of the Army for Operations
Research
ECP Engineering Change Proposal
EEROC Expedite Essential Required Operational Capability
EMD Engineering and Manufacturing Development
EOC Early Operational Capability
EUT&E Early User Test and Experimentation
FAAO Field Artillery Aerial Observer
FDT&E Force Development Test and Experimentation
FLIR Forward Looking Infrared
FORSCOM Forces Command





Government Composite Mission Scenario
108
IAS Integrated Avionics Subsystem
IG Inspector General
IOC Initial Operational Capability
IOT&E Initial Operational Test and Evaluation
IPR In Progress Review
LLTIME Long Lead Time Items, Material and Effort
LO Low Observable





















R&D Research and Development
RAH Reconnaissance, Attack Helicopter
RDTE Research Development Test and Evaluation
RFP Request for Proposal
SAT Simulation Assessment Team
SDDM Secretary of Defense Decision Memorandum
SECDEF Secretary of Defense
SOA Special Operations Aircraft
SOAR Special Operations Aviation Regiment
SOF Special Operations Forces
SSA Source Selection Authority
SSP Source Selection Plan
T&E Test and Evaluation
TEXCOM Test and Experimentation Command
TOA Total Obligation Authority
TRADOC Training and Doctrine Command
TSPR Total System Performance Responsibility
TTP Tactics, Techniques and Procedures
USAAVNC United States Army Aviation Center
USD(A&T) Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition &
Technology
USSOCOM United States Special Operations Command
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